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TEXT AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
TESTAMENTARY OBSOLESCENCE 
ADAM J. HIRSCH∗ 
Events may occur after a will is executed that ordinarily give rise to 
changes of intent regarding the estate plan—yet the testator may take no 
action to revoke or amend the original will. Should such a will be given 
literal effect? When, if ever, should lawmakers intervene to update a will 
on the testator's behalf?  
This is the problem of testamentary obsolescence. It reflects a 
fundamental, structural problem in law that can also crop up with regard 
to constitutions, statutes, and other performative texts, any one of which 
may become timeworn. This Article develops a theoretical framework for 
determining when lawmakers should—and should not—step in to revise 
wills that testators have left unaltered and endeavors to locate this 
framework in the context of other forms of textual obsolescence. The 
Article focuses on a variable denoted “friction”—that is, the extent of 
difficulty text makers face in revising texts on their own. Some testators 
become incapable of amending their wills, and some events display the 
dual property of altering testamentary intent while simultaneously 
disabling the testator from executing a new estate plan. In such instances, 
legal intervention to effectuate intent is warranted. Where testators remain 
at liberty to amend their wills following a change of circumstance, 
however, the case for legal intervention becomes uneasy. Nevertheless, 
lesser forms of friction may continue to operate, affording testators less 
practical opportunity to redo their wills, and hence again giving cause for 
lawmakers to interpret wills dynamically.  
When they do act to reinterpret a will in light of changed 
circumstances, lawmakers should ordinarily follow the course that a 
majority of testators would choose, as default rule theory dictates. Yet, 
legal intervention to effectuate probable intent could implicate error costs, 
if testators believe a different rule is in effect. By matching default rules of 
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will interpretation with common assumptions about what rules apply, 
lawmakers minimize error costs. As this Article demonstrates in the 
Appendix, under certain conditions an error-minimizing default is more 
efficient than a majoritarian default, a contribution to default rule theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the nineteenth century, Americans and Britons typically put off 
executing their wills until death was near.1 The resulting estate plans were 
timely but not always tidy, for testators often conceived them in haste. 
One of the early arguments against freedom of testation in Great Britain 
was that testators “visited with sickness, in their extreme agonies and 
 
 
 1. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318–20, 340 
(2d ed. reissued 1968) (observing that will execution typically formed a part of the last confession); 
George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 
1280, 1289 (1942). 
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pains,” might dispose of their estates “indiscreetly and unadvisedly.”2 
Since the twentieth century, deathbed wills have grown comparatively 
rare, and as a consequence the risk of testamentary indiscretion has 
receded.3 But every silver lining has its cloud. Wills drafted in the prime 
of life implicate a different peril—the risk of being overtaken by events. If 
a hiatus separates the time when a will is executed from the time when it 
matures, intervening occurrences—changes in the testator’s life—may 
render it less well adapted to his or her subsequent circumstances. 
This is the problem of testamentary obsolescence or, to borrow a 
scholar’s turn of phrase, the “stale will.”4 Viewed structurally, it reflects a 
fundamental dilemma that recurs in our law. Whenever a court is called 
upon to apply the performative words of others, it must decide whether to 
read those words statically or dynamically, in spite of or in light of 
evolving facts. Time does its work, and contracts, statutes, and 
constitutions, inter alia,5 along with wills, are all subject to the march of 
anno domini. Ultimately, lawmakers confront the core problem of textual 
obsolescence and ought to examine that problem in all fields of law from a 
common perspective, even if it yields different outcomes within individual 
fields.6 
The replication of strategies to avoid textual obsolescence bears 
witness to the unity of the problem. Text makers themselves can update 
their words, of course, and codicils to wills stand beside statutory and 
constitutional amendments.7 Alternatively, text makers can take immediate 
precautions against subsequent obsolescence. One possible response, 
developed independently within various textual categories, is to attach 
fuses to texts so that they self-destruct after a period of time. The texts will 
 
 
 2. Statute of Uses, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, preamble (Eng.). 
 3. The frequency of deathbed wills declined over the second half of the 19th century, Lawrence 
M. Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 37–39 (1964), a trend which may have played out over “several centuries.” Id. 
at 39 n.17. For other empirical evidence, see for example MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY 
AND INHERITANCE 65–69 (1970); Carol A. Engler-Bowles & Cary S. Kart, Intergenerational Relations 
and Testamentary Patterns: An Exploration, 23 GERONTOLOGIST 167, 168 (1983); Kristine S. 
Knaplund, The Evolution of Women’s Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 18–19 
(2008). 
 4. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1135 (1984). 
 5. For still another genre of aging text, see Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: 
Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824 passim (2007).  
 6. See Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1 passim (2004) (suggesting that a principled approach to the problems of statutory and 
constitutional obsolescence calls for their differentiation). 
 7. Although uncommon, the practice of executing codicils to wills already existed in Great 
Britain by the fifteenth century. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 340. 
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then enjoy too short a life span to become obsolescent. Thus, contracts 
typically cover “spot” transactions; long-term “relational” contracts are 
rarer. The statutory analogue is a sunset clause.8 If Thomas Jefferson had 
had his way, the federal Constitution would have expired every nineteen 
years.9 And some estate plans incorporate the same feature—a 
“conditional will” is tied to a looming hazard and becomes void if the 
testator survives that hazard.10 
To the extent they can anticipate fortuities that would render a text 
anachronistic, text makers can also build into it preservatives against 
staleness. Contingency clauses often decorate wills and contracts.11 Within 
some statutes, fallback provisions (usually anticipating the possibility of 
unconstitutionality) and indexing provisions perform an analogous 
function.12 
Alternatively, text makers may concede the futility of trying to 
anticipate every contingency and empower a delegate to revise their texts 
as circumstances evolve. In effect, that is what legislators do when they 
incorporate standards into statutes; a court can then reinterpret their 
application over time.13 In inheritance law, a power of appointment or 
discretionary trust serves this end. The donee of the power or the trustee 
will make distributive decisions as dictated by unfolding events. 
The problem remains that text makers may decline or neglect to take 
any of these steps—a distinct possibility among the makers of 
testamentary texts. One estate planner offers a bleak assessment: “If truth 
were known, I believe we would be aghast at the number of outstanding 
wills of living persons in this country which are obsolete, as far as 
reflecting the present wishes of the testator.”14 When, if ever, should 
 
 
 8. For a recent discussion, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy 
of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 passim (2006). 
 9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11 (1980). 
 10. Annotation, Determination Whether Will is Absolute or Conditional, 1 A.L.R.3d 1048 
(1965). Under late Roman codified law, all wills automatically became void after a period of ten years. 
Concern about obsolescence prompted this rule: a decade-old will was “antiquated by time . . . and in 
reality it is impious to say that the drawing up of a plan long before death is a last will.” THE 
THEODOSIAN CODE § 4.4.6, at 84 (Clyde Pharr trans., 1952) (418 AD). The rule disappeared under 
Justinian’s code of 529 AD. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 300 (Thomas Collett ed. & trans., 1853).  
 11. Contingency clauses in wills appeared on occasion from the middle ages onward. 2 POLLOCK 
& MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 340. 
 12. Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303 passim (2007); see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 104 (2006) (automatically adjusting dollar thresholds for inflation). 
 13. Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 494 
(1989). Statutes of this sort predominated in the nineteenth century, but today they are uncommon. 
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982). 
 14. Paul B. Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43 B.U. L. REV. 179, 190 (1963). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/2
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courts step in to update a text on its maker’s behalf? Specifically in the 
realm of wills, should courts ever infer textual revisions that testators 
themselves never formalized in an executed writing? 
In the pages following, we shall sketch a theoretical blueprint for 
analyzing this problem. And because similar issues arise in other textual 
arenas, we shall also strive to examine the problem in relation to its 
counterparts. In Part I, we consider situations where testators lack the 
opportunity to revise a will on their own, making judicial intervention 
potentially attractive. In Part II, we proceed to situations where testators 
do have that opportunity, making the case for judicial intervention more 
complicated and problematic. In the course of the analysis, and as 
elaborated in the Appendix, we shall propose a new sort of default rule, 
termed an error-minimizing default, that is demonstrably efficient under 
certain conditions and could prove to have broader theoretical 
significance. 
I. INTERVENTION IN THE PRESENCE OF FRICTION 
A. Theoretical Prologue 
In theory, courts are constrained to abide by the meaning of a legally 
performative text, as a reflection of its authors’ intent. Fidelity to the intent 
of legislators or framers follows from our observance of democratic 
principles. With regard to testamentary texts, lawmakers likewise 
acknowledge “the bedrock principle of honoring the intent of the 
testator,”15 a value grounded in public policy, if not political theory.16 The 
problem of textual obsolescence arises, conceptually, when a legally 
performative text no longer corresponds with the sentiments of its authors 
or their successors-in-interest. 
In a perfect world, the authors themselves would attend to the task of 
updating their texts with precision and dispatch. In the real world, that 
may not happen—and in some situations, we can anticipate the occurrence 
 
 
 15. In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 934 (Mont. 2000); see also, e.g., In re Wilkins’ Estate, 
211 N.W. 652, 653–54 (Wis. 1927) (exalting freedom of testation as a “sacred right”). For additional 
references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1114 (1996). 
 16. Scholarly rationales for freedom of testation emphasize three considerations: its tendency to 
promote the production of wealth, its tendency to promote the saving of wealth, and the testator’s 
comparative advantage to formulate a welfare-enhancing estate plan for the surviving family. For a 
critique, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. 
L.J. 1, 5–14 (1992). For a rare judicial annotation, see Wogan v. Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle 141, 145 
(Pa. 1824) (“[F]reedom of disposition . . . is one of the greatest excitements to enterprise and 
industry.”). 
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of obsolescence to be systematic. A key argument leveled against 
originalism in the context of constitutional interpretation is that the 
mechanism for amending the text is so cumbersome that the changed 
intent of the electorate (as successors to the framers) cannot realistically 
assert itself over time.17 A similar argument can be put forward, albeit less 
forcefully, in the context of statutory interpretation. Here, the impediments 
to change are quantitative rather than qualitative: once the legal landscape 
becomes crowded with statutes—a pattern that sesquipedalian scholars 
have dubbed “statutorification”—legislators fight a losing battle to keep 
all of their acts current.18 Inevitably, some acts are subordinated (an 
observation that brings us back to inheritance law, a field crawling with 
old vines).19 Originalists may still object to judicial intervention to update 
a text as undemocratic.20 Yet, if a court updates text by scrupulous 
reference to the sentiments of its authors, while ignoring the court’s own 
sympathies or inclinations, it can still claim adherence to democratic (and 
testamentary) values.  
In connection with testamentary texts, however, the assertion that 
obstacles stand in the way of currency is less compelling. Ordinarily, 
amending a will by codicil is simple and inexpensive; and whereas modern 
estate plans may combine multiple texts when disposing of assets outside 
of probate, multiplying in turn the number of required amendments, 
textual proliferation presents no parallel to statutorification.21 For this 
reason, originalism remains the dominant perspective on interpretation of 
 
 
 17. E.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 236 (1980); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1127, 1127–29 (1998); Henry P. Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 35 
(2004). By labeling this argument “the dead hand problem,” constitutional scholars allude, once again, 
to another category of potentially obsolescent text—gratuitous transfers of future interests. For a 
discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 16. 
 18. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 1–7. 
 19. See the references in Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 
1344 n.58 (2003). But compare Professor Bordwell:  
A surprising but more or less reassuring fact is the comparatively small number of changes 
[in inheritance statutes] that occur from year to year. If the statute law of wills is any 
criterion, our statute law is not the temporary, ephemeral thing that is sometimes supposed 
but for permanence and longevity compares very favorably with the case law. 
Percy Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (pt. 1), 14 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1928). 
 20. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 39–41 (1997). 
 21. The multiplication of donative texts may nevertheless complicate the updating process. 
Malcolm A. Moore, The Will Regenerate: From Whipping Boy to Workhorse, 7 PROB. LAW. 3, 10–12 
(1981); Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An 
Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 159–62 (2008). Although the analysis in this 
Article focuses on wills, it is equally applicable to other non-probate estate planning texts, which either 
substitute for or supplement wills. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/2
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wills. “A will may be so easily revoked by the testator in his lifetime,” one 
judge opined, “that the courts have been slow in permitting changes in 
circumstances to do by implication what the testator may so readily do for 
himself.”22 
That said, we can nonetheless identify settings in which this 
assumption breaks down, settings in which testators pursuing a path to will 
revision are bound to encounter “friction” of various kinds and degrees. 
Therein lie the rudiments of a case for dynamic interpretation of 
testamentary text. 
B. Loss of Capacity  
One circumstance that could stymie self-revision of a will is incapacity. 
Lawmakers deny incapacitated testators the right to alter their wills, lest 
they cease to display the detailed thoughtfulness that comprises one of the 
social benefits of granting freedom of testation in the first place.23 Still, an 
unalterable estate plan may grow thoughtless anyway, given its 
unresponsiveness to the drift of events. All else being equal, the will of an 
incapacitated testator is frozen into place even more firmly than a 
constitution or a statute.24 
Should lawmakers intervene to allow a guardian to update the 
incapacitated testator’s will on his or her behalf? Considered structurally, 
the problem of incapacity is very like—indeed, an anticipatory extension 
of—the problem of dead hand control: to the extent a testator’s will creates 
trusts that continue after death, we again face the prospect of an 
increasingly archaic estate plan that the testator is unavailable to amend. It 
is metaphysical to speak of effectuating intent ex post in either context: a 
testator who lacks capacity or dies has lost the capability to “intend,” 
whether rationally or ontologically.25 Still, lawmakers can undertake to 
effectuate probable intent ex ante. The question then becomes whether the 
typical testator would prefer that someone else step into his or her shoes 
upon incapacity or death to keep the estate plan current. Whereas some 
 
 
 22. In re Jones’ Estate, 60 A. 915, 922 (Pa. 1905). 
 23. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 16, at 12–13; Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the 
Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 48–49 (2006); see supra note 16. 
 24. For an early discussion, see Warner v. Beach, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 162, 162–65 (1855) 
(rejecting the argument that “the long continued insanity of the testator” should invalidate a will made 
previously, when the testator was of sound mind). 
 25. Compare Professor Fellows, who asserts that the incapacitated testator’s “inability to 
formulate subjective intent is an artificial barrier to the state’s decision to impute intent,” because a 
court can glean “what decisions the [testator] would have made if legally competent and properly 
advised.” Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 623 (1988).  
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might appreciate this service, others would decline it for fear of abuse or 
want of insight into the testator’s donative perspective. No polling data on 
testators’ preferences in this regard have yet come to light. 
Historically, guardians’ tutelary powers failed to include a right to 
revise the estate plan of a ward.26 Courts and legislators have gradually 
widened those powers,27 a trend the Commissioners promulgating 
Uniform Acts seek to encourage. As originally drafted, the Uniform 
Probate Code (the “Code”) stopped short of allowing a guardian to execute 
or amend a ward’s will, but the Code did grant guardians power, with the 
court’s approval, to execute or amend a revocable inter vivos trust.28 
Because such a trust supersedes a will, guardians have effective control 
over the estate plan.29 In 1998, the Commissioners dropped the façade, 
revising the Code to allow guardians with the court’s approval to make or 
amend a ward’s will directly,30 although few states have adopted this 
rule.31 In ratifying or rejecting the guardian’s testamentary decisions, the 
court “shall consider primarily the decision that the protected person 
would have made, to the extent that the decision can be ascertained.”32 An 
analogous provision appears in the Uniform Trust Code of 2000, giving 
the court power to update, “in accordance with the settlor’s probable 
intention,” the substantive terms of a trust otherwise immobilized by the 
dead hand where “circumstances not anticipated by the settler” intervene.33 
 
 
 26. René A. Wormser, The Doctrine of Substitution of Judgment, 9 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 15-1, 
15-8 (1975). 
 27. Id. at 15-2 to 15-13. 
 28. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-407(b)(3), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 386 (1998) (pre-1998 Article 5, expressly 
proscribing revision of wills). See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(f) & cmt. (amended 2005), 7C 
U.L.A. 546 (2006) (laying down the same rule). 
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f (2003). 
 30. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(4), (7). Some testators subject to a guardianship may not 
lack testamentary capacity, since the two legal standards are not coextensive. The Code specifies, 
however, that a court should “make the least restrictive order consistent with its findings,” and thus 
should limit guardians’ powers only to the ward’s “demonstrated needs.” Id. § 4-409(b) & cmt. 
Therefore, if a potential ward retains testamentary capacity, the court could create a “limited 
guardianship” for the ward and withhold testamentary power from the guardian. See id. § 5-304(b)(7), 
(8) (distinguishing limited from unlimited guardianships).  
 31. Whereas three states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code’s rule, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
14-411(1)(g) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-411(a)(7) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411(a)(9) 
(West 2007), three other jurisdictions have equivalent non-Uniform statutes. CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 2580(b)(13) (Deering 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 29A-5-420 (1997). For a recent case applying the California statute, see Murphy v. Murphy, 
78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784 (App. Ct. 2008). 
 32. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(c). 
 33. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). No such power existed under prior trust law apart from the 
more limited one, restricted to charitable trusts, created by the cy pres doctrine. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/2
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There remains a structural contradiction within these respective 
provisions. Both ostensibly function to carry out benefactors’ substantive 
intent. Yet both also take the form of mandatory rules.34 In neither instance 
can benefactors opt out of the process for textual revision by express 
statement in the will or trust,35 as they could if presented with a default 
rule.36 Were these provisions framed as default rules, it would initially be 
incumbent on the Commissioners to determine that most benefactors 
would authorize a surrogate not selected by themselves to second guess 
their intent, a matter that calls for empirical inquiry.37 For mandatory rules, 
no such inquiry is necessary, but then the Commissioners must justify the 
novel restrictions on freedom of testation that these provisions impose.38 
The wisdom of such restrictions is hardly manifest.39 
 
 
 34. The Uniform Trust Code provision is explicitly mandatory. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4). 
Within guardianship law, a prospective ward can only oppose the petition, which is then judged by the 
court. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-308. 
 35. Benefactors could nevertheless name their own estate planning surrogate as trustee of a 
discretionary trust or holder of a power of appointment to ensure flexibility upon incapacity or death, 
thereby effectively superseding other legal processes. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.5(3) & cmt. c, statutory note 14 (1983) (on the serviceability of a durable 
power of attorney for this purpose). The fact remains, however, that some fraction of benefactors will 
not want to entrust estate planning authority to anyone. 
 36. Or can they? The Uniform Trust Code gives a court authority to modify the terms of a trust 
“if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification . . . will further the purposes 
of the trust,” and this is ostensibly a mandatory rule. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4), 412(a). Yet, if 
the trust instrument provides that its terms should remain fixed even if circumstances change, could 
not one argue that the settlor has anticipated the possibility of a change of circumstance, generally if 
not specifically, thereby precluding recourse to modification under the plain language of the Uniform 
Trust Code? Similarly, under the Uniform Probate Code a provision in the will indicating that if a 
guardian is ever appointed he or she should not modify the will’s terms even if circumstances change 
arguably reveals the testator’s intent which, according to the Code, is supposed to guide the guardian’s 
actions. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 37. A “majoritarian” default rule minimizes transaction costs. On the public policy of default 
rules, see Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033–77 (2004). 
 38. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 39. The traditional temporal boundary on freedom of testation is set by the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, extending the diktat of the will to the death of persons alive at the testator’s death plus the 
minority of the succeeding generation. On the public policy of this rule (a large subject in itself), see 
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 16. The concern some benefactors may entertain that a power lodged in a 
third party to update their estate plans, even one monitored by courts, will turn out to thwart their 
intent cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. See Stephanie Strom, Donors Gone, Trusts Veer from 
Their Wishes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A1 (related discussion). Furthermore, restrictions on 
freedom of testation may have the perverse effect of pushing the determined benefactor to evade them 
in sub-optimal ways. A benefactor seeking to exercise inflexible dead hand control might thus create 
future interests out of trust, thereby escaping the reach of the Uniform Trust Code. Likewise, a 
benefactor seeking to insulate an estate plan from interference by an anticipated guardian could be 
driven while capable to create inter vivos future interests with a retained life estate. 
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C. Loss of Opportunity  
Once we acknowledge that inability to update a will could provide 
grounds for legal intervention, we have to consider the range of situations 
where such a handicap could arise. Executing a will requires more than 
just mental capacity. It also requires time—always a scarce resource and 
sometimes very scarce. 
It may happen that an event has the interesting, dual property of 
altering the testator’s intent while also depriving the testator of a realistic 
opportunity to revise his or her estate plan to reflect the change. In that 
case, assuming they can readily deduce the testator’s preferred revision, 
lawmakers further the cause of intent effectuation by amending the will on 
the testator’s behalf. Although structurally analogous, the events falling 
into this category are situationally diverse. 
1. Common Calamities 
Consider the case where a testator and a beneficiary named under the 
will suffer a common calamity—for instance, an automobile accident in 
which one is the driver and the other a passenger—that mortally wounds 
both of them. Even if the beneficiary survives the testator by a short while, 
we can predict that the testator would prefer to substitute a different taker. 
Now on death’s door, the beneficiary will have no occasion to enjoy the 
bequest, and it will pass in short order to others selected to inherit under 
the beneficiary’s, instead of the testator’s, estate plan. Yet, the testator has 
no chance to revise the will to take account of this change of circumstance. 
His or her own wounds, coeval with the beneficiary’s, preclude execution 
of a codicil. 
The first scholar to light upon this problem was an improbable one: 
John Wigmore, who made his reputation in the field of evidence, not 
wills.40 Addressing the problem of simultaneous death, where there is no 
way of knowing who survived whom, and hence who is a beneficiary of 
whom, Wigmore observed that the question was properly one of intent, not 
of evidence.41 This insight led him to endorse a rule of disinheritance for 
 
 
 40. Professor Wigmore’s contribution has been forgotten: it goes unmentioned in modern 
discussions of the subject. See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s 
New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1091–99 (1992).  
 41. “A presumption merely shifts the duty to produce evidence . . . [b]ut here it is assumed that 
no evidence can be produced. Therefore the solution . . . is not an evidential rule of presumption, but a 
rule for the Distribution of Property.” 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2532a, at 483 (3d ed. 1940) (in the 3d ed. only). 
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simultaneously dying beneficiaries, but also to propose—albeit as “a 
radical novelty”42—that the same rule extend to beneficiaries who survive 
the testator briefly. This proposal, Wigmore continued, was  
based on the idea that to change totally the devolution of an estate 
because of its vesting for a brief moment . . . is contrary to the 
testator’s intention, and therefore unfair. . . . [H]e certainly did not 
intend that it should go to . . . a semi-corpse that retained only the 
semblance of physical vitality for a few moments.43  
The drafters of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act incorporated 
Wigmore’s proposal into their provisional draft,44 but they struck it from 
the final Act of 1940.45 It was left to the drafters of the Uniform Probate 
Code of 1969 to rediscover the idea. Under the Code, all beneficiaries 
must survive the testator by at least five days in order to take their 
bequests, unless the will provides otherwise.46 
Whether this approach is optimal remains a question. The difficulty 
with any bright-line postmortem survival (or “overlive”) requirement is 
that it is arbitrary.47 On the other hand, a variable standard (for instance, a 
rule disinheriting any beneficiary who dies as a result of a common 
accident with the testator) is flexible but would breed litigation. Estate 
planners routinely include overlive requirements in the wills they prepare, 
and these give some indication of the typical testator’s intent. Estate 
planners avoid framing these requirements as variable standards,48 but they 
usually run longer than the five days provided for under the Code—thirty 
 
 
 42. Id. § 2532a, at 487. 
 43. Id. For Wigmore’s proposal, see JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2532a, at 1211–13 (2d ed. Supp. 1934) (no 
beneficiary takes “unless a clear interval of time between the deaths is shown to have elapsed, such 
that the person dying later had an opportunity to make a testate disposition of the property.”). 
 44. The draft is reprinted in 9 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 2532a, at 484–87. Under the draft, a 
beneficiary did not take “unless such an interval of time between the deaths is shown to have elapsed 
that the survivor had a clear period of consciousness.” Id. at 486. 
 45. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (amended 1953), 8B U.L.A. 164 (2001) (omitting the 
proposed provision). 
 46. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (b), (d) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 182 (1998). A similar 
provision has appeared in every iteration of the Code since its debut in 1969 and now also appears in 
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, as revised in 1993. UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT §§ 3, 6 
(1993), 8B U.L.A. 149, 152 (2001). Only eleven jurisdictions have adopted a rule of this sort, however. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 statutory note 2 
(1999).  
 47. For a case litigating whether a beneficiary had satisfied or failed to satisfy an overlive 
requirement by five minutes, see Estate of Davies, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 239, 241 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 48. JOSEPH TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 72–74 (rev. ed. 1968); Addison E. Dewey, 
Testators Who Die Intestate, 7 PROB. L.J. 221, 244–45 (1987) (giving examples of litigation that 
ensued when beneficiaries were required to survive until the estate was distributed). 
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or sixty days are now commonplace.49 Medical technology has progressed 
since the Code was promulgated, and “semi-corpses” can linger longer 
than in Wigmore’s day. In its treatment of this segment of the problem of 
obsolescent wills, the Code may itself have grown to become 
obsolescent.50 
2. Slayings 
Another case presenting the same structural circumstance differs in 
every other respect. Consider a beneficiary who slays the testator. Pointing 
a sharp metal object at the testator’s throat and thrusting it forward is the 
sort of act likely to snap the sociological bonds that previously tied the 
testator to his or her assailant. But the testator lacks time to communicate 
the change of intent following from that act: in this instance, the sword is 
mightier than the pen. For lawmakers to intervene here (as with a common 
calamity51) is to impute a change of intent that did come about, by 
hypothesis, and which empirical data may confirm,52 but that the testator 
had no opportunity to express. 
However judiciously, lawmakers have responded to the problem. 
Under “slayer statutes,” currently found in forty-four states and also 
featured in the Uniform Probate Code, slayer-beneficiaries forfeit their 
inheritances.53 Historically, though, lawmakers have propounded a 
different rationale for this outcome: “the prevention of unjust enrichment, 
in accord with the maxim that a wrongdoer cannot profit by his or her 
 
 
 49. JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE AND TRUST PLANNING 18 (2005); JOHN R. 
PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 4.15.4 (2d ed. 2000). Even longer overlive 
requirements appear sporadically in wills, e.g., In re Estate of Keller, 46 P.3d 1135, 1136 (Kan. 2002) 
(one-year requirement), but these are inadvisable because they delay probate and can have adverse tax 
consequences. PRICE, supra, § 4.15.4. 
 50. As early as 1932 (before Wigmore turned his attention to the problem), Ohio mandated a 
thirty-day overlive requirement, see Legislation, Statutory Solutions of the Problem of Survival in a 
Common Disaster, 50 HARV. L. REV. 344, 348 (1936), as do several Australian territories today. Wills 
Act, 2000, N. TERR. AUSTL. LAWS § 34 (2007); Succession Act, 1982, QUEENSL. PUB. ACTS § 33B(1) 
(2006); Wills Act, 1997, VICT. STAT. § 39 (2007). The Ohio statute was repealed in 2002, when Ohio 
adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 2002 Ohio Laws file 90 (H.B. No. 242). 
 51. The two circumstances could arise in the same case, where a slayer-beneficiary commits 
suicide shortly after the slaying. E.g., In re Estate of Miller, 840 So.2d 703 (Miss. 2003) (construing 
the two rules in pari materia). 
 52. Obviously, we cannot poll victims of either common calamities or slayings, but we can 
present testators with hypothetical questions to discover what they anticipate their intent would be. 
 53. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 2008); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 reporter’s note 1 
(1999). Other states bar slayers’ inheritances by case law. Id. § 8.4 reporter’s note 6.  
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wrong.”54 In other words, the rule has criminological overtones and shares 
the same inspiration as Son of Sam laws.55 The rule’s alternative 
justification as a means of effectuating testators’ probable wishes has not 
gone unnoticed,56 but it is plainly subordinate. Thus, slayer statutes set out 
a mandatory rule that supersedes even an express provision to the contrary 
in a will (as conceivably might appear in connection with an assisted 
suicide).57 
This much is reasonable enough. Where the policies of criminal law 
and inheritance law collide, avoiding wrongdoing should take 
precedence.58 The troubling structural aspect of slayer statutes is their 
singular fixation on wrongdoing, which narrows their scope. The policies 
of unjust enrichment-cum-deterrence on one hand, and intent effectuation 
on the other, cover intersecting sets of circumstances. The union of these 
two sets defines the proper scope of slayer statutes. 
Consider the matter of criminal defenses. Slayer statutes only 
invalidate a bequest to one “who feloniously and intentionally kills the 
[testator].”59 Hence, with rare exception, they do permit a slayer-
beneficiary who successfully pleads insanity to take under the will.60 
Confining the operation of the statute in this way tracks criminal law 
 
 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 8.4 cmt. b. For an equivalent observation, see, for 
example, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 cmt. 
 55. Some forty states plus the federal government now prevent criminals, by analogy, from 
profiting out of the publicity generated by their crimes. Orly Nosrati, Note, Son of Sam Laws: Killing 
Free Speech or Promoting Killer Profits?, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 949, 953 nn.48–49 (1999). 
 56. Bennett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 A.2d 115, 117–18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Riggs v. 
Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 192 (N.Y. 1889) (Gray, J., dissenting); In re Wilkins’ Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 656 
(Wis. 1927). For academic discussions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.2 
(7th ed. 2007); Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
489, 504–06 (1986); William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. 
REV. 65, 71–72 (1969); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 
803, 860–63 (1993). 
 57. In two jurisdictions, however, the slayer statute operates as a default rule. LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. arts. 941, 943, 945 (2000) (allowing the slayer to inherit if he or she “proves reconciliation with 
or forgiveness by the decedent”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6) (West 2002) (allowing a decedent to 
override the slayer statute by specific reference in a will, and alternatively allowing the court to 
override the statute in deference to “the decedent’s wishes”). 
 58. But see Sherman, supra note 56, at 856–76 (proposing and defending exceptions from the 
operation of slayer statutes for assisted suicide and mercy killings).  
 59. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b). 
 60. E.g., Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 398–99 (Md. 1986) (“[T]he slayer’s rule is simply not 
applicable when the killer was not criminally responsible at the time he committed the homicide. . . . 
[T]he maxims prompting the rule—no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud . . . [are] 
inappropriate when a person is criminally insane.”). For earlier cases, see id. at 400–04; Michael G. 
Walsh, Annotation, Homicide as Precluding Taking Under Will or By Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787, 
863–68 (1983). Slayer statutes bar inheritance by insane slayers in only two states. IND. CODE § 29-1-
2-12.1(a) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19(A), (C) (LexisNexis 2002). 
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policies. From the vantage of inheritance policy, however, such 
confinement is doubtful. A slayer-beneficiary’s subjective inability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct may not typically 
forestall the victim’s last-minute change of intent. Likewise, and without 
exception, slayer statutes permit a slayer-beneficiary who successfully 
claims self-defense to take under a will.61 Yet, in these circumstances, we 
can infer a change of intent with some confidence. If, after all, evidence 
shows that a slayer-beneficiary was defending against the testator’s deadly 
force, as required for the defense to succeed,62 then that same evidence 
indicates that the testator’s relationship with the beneficiary had grown, to 
say the least, discordant. Ironically, what is exculpatory for one purpose is 
probative for the other. Slayer statutes should reflect probable changes of 
intent in both of these situations,63 but only as default rules (since 
criminal-law policy is no longer implicated). 
Unintentional killings, which come under the heading of involuntary 
manslaughter, in most jurisdictions fall outside the purview of slayer 
statutes.64 As a criminological matter, broadening their reach would serve 
to deter the aggravated negligence required for a finding of involuntary 
manslaughter,65 a policy lawmakers pursue elsewhere by assessing 
punitive damages, another “quasi-criminal”66 remedy. Be this as it may, 
most testators might prefer to disinherit slayers in these cases—
particularly if willful conduct to injure the testator short of death, but 
nevertheless resulting in death, was involved.67  
Except in two jurisdictions,68 beneficiaries who commit acts of 
violence against testators that do not cause their deaths remain entitled to 
inherit under their wills. Because they do not accelerate an estate plan, 
injurious assaults afford no wrongful gain to an assailant-beneficiary. Nor, 
from the standpoint of intent effectuation, do injurious assaults disable 
testators from retaliating by revising their wills. 
 
 
 61. Sherman, supra note 56, at 848 n.210; Walsh, supra note 60, at 820–21. 
 62. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(b) (4th ed. 2003). 
 63. Direct inquiry is again impossible, but we can assess the attitudes of testators by presenting 
them with hypotheticals. Query, incidentally, whether testators polled ex ante would excuse self-
defense if they themselves were mentally ill when they assaulted the beneficiary. Refinements may be 
necessary. 
 64. In eight states, however, slayer laws do apply to unintentional-but-criminal killings. 
Sherman, supra note 56, at 848 n.213. For academic commentary, compare POSNER, supra note 56, 
§ 18.2, at 544; Fellows, supra note 56, at 496–99; McGovern, supra note 56, at 92–93. 
 65. LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 15.4(a), at 794–95. 
 66. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). 
 67. Such conduct often constitutes involuntary manslaughter. LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 14.3. 
 68. See infra note 149 (Louisiana and Oregon). 
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We can hypothesize one special scenario, however, implicating just 
such a disability. Consider an assault that injures a testator seriously 
enough to rob him or her of testamentary capacity. Even though the 
testator may live on for years, he or she now lacks the wherewithal to 
respond by amending the will.69 If polling data confirms that most testators 
would disinherit their assailants under these conditions, then slayer 
statutes should again cover the case with a default rule.  
3. The Relevance of Imputed Intent 
Of course, the deprivation of opportunity to amend a will in connection 
with incapacity, common calamity, and slaying only arises at the time 
when the disabling event occurs. A testator could plan ahead for any such 
predicament by inserting contingency clauses into his or her will. Because 
this opportunity exists before the fact, we might argue, lawmakers have 
less reason to concern themselves with effectuating intent thereafter. 
Fidelity to intent follows from our embrace of freedom of testation, yet its 
value to society derives from the scope this freedom creates for active 
estate planning, not from reconstructing presumptive shifts of intent. On 
this basis, we might temper our concern for intent effectuation, placing the 
onus on testators to expound their wishes—whether present or 
anticipated—within an executed writing.70  
Yet even if effectuating imputed intent under conditions of friction 
goes beyond the pale (and policies) of freedom of testation, we have other 
reasons for doing so. This move promotes both efficiency and equity. It is 
expensive for testators to plan for every contingency, however remote. 
Whereas in most instances testators can wait to see whether unlikely 
contingencies come to pass, and then react with codicils, they do not enjoy 
that luxury when friction would intervene. Intent-effectuating default rules 
that cover disabling events spare testators transaction costs.71 What is 
more, human foresight is imperfect. The cognitive costs of simulating 
future states of the world (known in the psychological literature as 
 
 
 69. The case of the heiress Sunny von Bulow is illustrative: Although acquitted of the criminal 
charge, her husband was alleged to have attempted to murder her by insulin injection in 1980. She 
survived but fell into a persistent coma, remaining in that state until her death, twenty-eight years later. 
Enid Nemy, Sunny von Bulow, Whose Near Death Started a Society Drama, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2008, at A42. 
 70. For a fuller statement of this rhetorical argument, see Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1042–44. See 
also supra note 16. 
 71. POSNER, supra note 56, § 4.1, at 96, § 18.2, at 544. For an early recognition, see HENRY 
SUGDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF WILLS 221 app. (London, S. Sweet 1837). 
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prospection) produce simplified visions that overlook possibilities and 
thereby condemn testators to some degree of textual incompleteness.72 
Persons also tend selectively to put out of their minds (via denial) 
prospects that are unpleasant to contemplate.73 Estate planners have 
encountered all of this in practice, observing in clients an inclination to 
view their world as static and to resist pondering painful contingencies.74 
Professional will drafters better understand what the future may bring, 
and their work products could—if need be—take into account 
contingencies that are coupled with disabling events. Estate planners 
routinely provide for the contingency of a common calamity,75 and some 
also attend to the possibility of incapacity.76 But a significant fraction of 
wills are composed by testators acting without benefit of counsel,77 and 
these lay drafters are poorly equipped for the task at hand. By establishing 
a panoply of intent-effectuating default rules to cover the scenarios 
addressed in the foregoing pages, lawmakers can provide testators with a 
substitute for counsel they may lack the means to afford. In so doing, 
lawmakers help to destratify the process of will-making.78 
Ultimately, then, intent effectuation holds value in itself, not merely as 
a concomitant to freedom of testation. 
II. INTERVENTION IN THE ABSENCE OF FRICTION 
A. Impossibility 
When we turn to changes of circumstance that testators remain at 
liberty to answer by revising their wills, the case for legal activism to 
update text becomes uneasy. Yet, where the change is of a nature as to 
 
 
 72. Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll, Self-Projection and the Brain, 11 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 49 passim (2007); Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing 
the Future, 317 SCI. 1351 passim (2007); see also George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in 
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209 passim (2003) (elaborating a related phenomenon). For 
an early recognition, see Jeremy Bentham, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 190–91 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (1802). 
 73. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 125 (1993). 
 74. THOMAS L. SHAFFER ET AL., THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 14–15 
(5th ed. 2007); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS 123–24 (1970); Sargent, 
supra note 14, at 191–92. 
 75. See supra notes 48–49.  
 76. See supra note 35. 
 77. For British data on the frequency of homemade wills, which are statistically correlated with 
poverty, see JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND FAMILIES 45–46 (1996). 
 78. For defenses of this norm, which Professor Fellows labels “equal planning under the law,” 
see Fellows, supra note 25, at 613; Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1051–52; see also id. at 1044–61 (related 
discussion). 
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make the original estate plan impossible to implement, some sort of 
intervention has to occur. Courts can do many things, but they cannot do 
the impossible. Here they have no choice but to deviate from the strict 
letter of a document’s text. 
In the context of legislation, the traditional canon of construction holds 
that when statutes are or become impossible to carry out (constitutionality 
being the usual stumbling block), they are invalid.79 A court will not, in 
other words, conjecture how legislators would rather proceed within the 
realm of the possible, presumably because they can make that decision for 
themselves once the status quo has been restored. Testators can also revise 
an impossible estate plan; but when a court encounters one that a decedent 
failed to revise, it is too late to restore the status quo. At this point, the 
court can only substitute a new plan for the one stymied by events.80 
Impossibility in the context of wills arises chiefly in two situations: (1) 
where property testators bequeathed no longer remains within their 
inventory of possessions and hence is no longer theirs to give away; and 
(2) where named beneficiaries (by analogy) are no longer alive and hence 
are unavailable to accept bequests. By striving to effectuate probable 
intent in these situations, lawmakers can again destratify the inheritance 
process and reduce transaction costs.81 
Determining how best to accomplish this result requires analysis at two 
levels. First, we must ask how testators in general would prefer to revise 
an impossible estate plan. Would the typical testator wish to substitute for 
a bequest of specific property no longer owned a bequest of other property 
equal in value? Would the typical testator wish to substitute for a bequest 
to a predeceasing beneficiary a bequest to that beneficiary’s children, or 
 
 
 79. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *91. 
 80. An estate plan might have been impossible to implement even when it was executed, but that 
raises a problem strictly of mistake, not obsolescence. We may also note an analogy to the problem of 
postmortem impossibility, raised in connection with future interests. Here, the cy pres doctrine applies, 
traditionally an intent-focused rule once again. 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§ 399, at 476 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989). 
 81. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. Since testators can revise an impossible estate 
plan, disparities of intent effectuation here arise not strictly out of better or worse planning, but out of 
greater or less diligence. Yet estate planners will also anticipate these circumstances as a matter of 
course and provide for them via contingency clauses—hence, in practice, opening a divide between 
well drafted estate plans that require no diligence and poorly drafted ones that do. As further discussed 
below, the expectations of the parties can affect the efficiency of an inheritance default, if ignorant 
testators generally share the same assumption about what the default rule is. See infra notes 114–18 
and accompanying text & Appendix. Whether that is true as concerns lost property or predeceasing 
beneficiaries is uncertain and merits investigation, although there is no prima facie reason to anticipate 
a convergence of assumptions in either regard. 
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perhaps spouse, as opposed to the testator’s residuary legatee (or heirs)? 
These questions demand empirical inquiry. 
Second, we must address whether evidence of a testator’s intent in the 
particular case should override assumptions of intent drawn in the general 
case. Surely, courts should bar evidence of the testator’s declarations 
following, and in response to, the occurrence of impossibility. No friction 
appears in these scenarios, so testators remain free to respond by 
formalizing any new intent that impossibility forces them to contemplate. 
Lawmakers should require formalization of changed intent, at least in the 
absence of friction, for the same reasons they require formal execution of 
the original will: it certifies finality of intent and offers a measure of 
protection against fraud.82 At the same time, one could make a case for 
allowing courts to consider other features of the estate plan, together with 
extrinsic evidence of a testator’s underlying motives for the impossible 
bequest, and of the precise circumstances causing impossibility, in order to 
glean how that particular testator would have provided for the contingency 
ex ante. Case-by-case analysis can effectuate intent (which may vary a 
great deal) more accurately, and reading between the lines of the original 
will does not strictly violate the execution requirement. The other side of 
the coin is that case-by-case analysis implicates additional litigation, and 
thus administrative costs.83 Furthermore, the analysis involves inference 
rather than construction, since the testator never expressed an executed 
intent concerning unanticipated contingencies. Hence, in seeking to divine 
how a testator would have answered a question that was never formally 
posed, the court could still fall victim to error, if not fraud.84 
 
 
 82. As one court opined: 
The process of making testamentary bequests by a will is not akin to the donning and doffing 
of a suit of clothing. . . . “In no other field of law should more care be taken over a decision to 
lessen requirements than in the field of Wills where the introduction of fraud must be guarded 
against to a greater extent because . . . the lips of the main ‘witness’ (the testator) are sealed.” 
In re Estate of Weston, 833 A.2d 490, 492 (D.C. 2003) (quoting In re Lee’s Estate, 80 F. Supp. 293, 
294 (D.D.C. 1948)). For a further analysis of the justifications for will execution formalities, see 
Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1060–69. Declarations made by the testator to an attorney or other fiduciary 
are safer from fraud but still provide no assurance of finality. 
 83. For an early observation, see Humphreys v. Humphreys, (1789) 30 Eng. Rep. 85, 85 (Ch.) 
(Thurlow, C.) (“[D]iscussing what were the particular motives and intention of the testator in each case 
[of bequests of absent property] . . . would be productive of endless uncertainty and confusion.”). 
 84. We have some experience with a liberal rule of evidence in connection with patent and latent 
ambiguities, since courts nowadays do routinely look beyond the four walls of a will to clarify its 
meaning. Doing so has not occasioned any conspicuous mischief. The problems, though, are not 
identical: In the case of linguistic ambiguity, we know the testator meant something by the words he or 
she used; in the case of contingencies missing from the will, we must infer what the testator would 
have intended if he or she had considered the contingency, and that is a more problematic exercise. For 
an argument that courts should admit some forms of extrinsic evidence to determine intent in 
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Existing rules covering these matters leave much to be desired. 
Consider first bequests to predeceasing beneficiaries. These bequests 
“lapse” and flow into the testator’s residuary estate under common law, 
unless an “antilapse” statute diverts them to the predeceasing beneficiary’s 
descendants. In a plurality of states, antilapse statutes supersede the 
common law of lapse only as concerns bequests to close blood relatives.85 
The underlying assumption is that testators’ relationships with their 
kinfolk extend to their descendants. If blood relatives predecease, the 
typical testator would likely wish to provide for their progeny instead. On 
the other hand, testators might have weaker ties to the families of 
beneficiaries who are not blood relatives (employees, for example), and so 
we can have less confidence that the typical testator would wish to treat 
their progeny as testamentary surrogates.86 
Perhaps, perhaps. But all of this needs empirical testing. It might turn 
out, for instance, that with regard to some categories of beneficiary the 
typical testator would prefer to name as a substitute taker the beneficiary’s 
surviving spouse—some extant data raises this possibility.87 And we also 
need to discover where to draw the line (assuming one should be drawn at 
all88) between those bequests that lapse and those that do not. All told, 
depending on the state, these lines currently fall all over the substantive 
 
 
connection with bequests to predeceasing beneficiaries, see Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are 
Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335 passim (1985). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 statutory 
note (1999). 
 86. In re Connolly’s Estate, 222 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Wis. 1974); Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1129. 
 87. FINCH ET AL., supra note 77, at 138–43 (British data); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process 
and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 282–84 (1963). Professor 
Browder considered this option “perfectly natural, particularly when the [predeceasing beneficiary’s] 
issue are likely to be minors,” although his data contained few examples of this preference. Olin L. 
Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. 
REV. 1303, 1322–27 (1969) (quotation at 1326). Cf. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 40, at 1101–02 
(defending the traditional rule). For the one state statute deviating from the rule that only progeny can 
serve as substitutes, see MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (LexisNexis 2001). In several 
Canadian provinces, the beneficiary’s surviving spouse can take under antilapse statutes in certain 
circumstances. See, e.g., Wills Act, R.S.B.C. § 29 (1996); Wills Act, NFLD. R.S. § 18(1) (1990); 
Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. § 31 (1990).  
 88. Whether typical testators intend a different substitute for predeceasing relatives and non-
relatives needs inquiry. The drafters of the first British antilapse statute of 1837 who ushered in this 
structural distinction, still found in modern statutes, did not justify it as intent-effectuating—that 
appears to have been a subsequent rationalization. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Rather, 
the British drafters were “not disposed to recommend alterations of the present laws further than cases 
of frequent occurrence and great hardship appear to render necessary; and we therefore confine our 
recommendation of an amendment in this respect to the cases of . . . children and grandchildren of the 
testator.” SUGDEN, supra note 71, at 222 app. For commentary questioning the restriction of the 
antilapse concept, see JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 393 (7th ed. 2005); 
French, supra note 84, at 365–66. 
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map.89 The rule found in the Uniform Probate Code has its own unique 
features, but if the Commissioners wish to separate their line from this 
confused jumble, they must support it with something more concrete than 
inference.90 
When we turn to the structurally analogous problem of specifically 
bequeathed property that disappears before the testator’s death, the legal 
landscape grows bleaker still. These bequests automatically “adeem by 
extinction”—that is, they become void, and the named beneficiary 
receives nothing.91 This rule is not based on empirical evidence or even 
inference of intent but follows rather from the formalistic finding of 
impossibility—the “fact that the thing bequeathed does not exist.”92 
Lawmakers nevertheless could replace the bequeathed property with 
similar property or funds of equivalent value. Doing so might or might not 
correspond with the typical testator’s intent. Lawmakers inclined to 
explore the question could study the empirical significance of any number 
of variables: the kind of property involved,93 its relative value, the 
relationship between the testator and the beneficiary,94 the circumstances 
that caused the property to disappear,95 or what followed.96 The Uniform 
 
 
 89. See supra note 85. 
 90. Under the Code, the antilapse statute covers bequests to stepchildren (but not other affines), 
along with close blood relatives. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 49 
(Supp. 2008). The accompanying comment asserts that the Code establishes a rule of “presumed 
intention” but cites no evidence, although some pertinent data does exist. Id. § 2-603 cmt.; supra note 
87. At the same time, the Code applies a different antilapse rule (applicable to all beneficiaries) with 
respect to future interests, including living trusts, id. § 2-707(b), (d), even though these are 
functionally equivalent to wills. Regarding stepchildren, the Commissioners apparently infer that if a 
testator bequeaths to one, this fact implies they have formed a bond comparable to a consanguineous 
tie. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 40, at 1121–23 (offering an example). But why then does the 
Code not extend this inference to bequests to step-grandchildren, or to step-siblings? The 
accompanying comment offers no rationale, although it notes the statutory distinction. UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-603 cmt.; cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(c) (Deering 2004) (extending the antilapse statute to 
all kin of a spouse). Query also whether the relative size of a bequest is a significant variable. 
Arguably, when a bequest to a non-relative comprises a substantial fraction of the estate, its very scale 
implies that the beneficiary comprises virtual family. French, supra note 84, at 364–67. For a variety 
of suggestions for statutory reform of antilapse doctrine, see id. at 363–73. 
 91. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 88, at 405–06. 
 92. In re Estate of Fox, 431 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301, 
305 (1853)). “[I]ntention has nothing to do with the matter.” In re Wright’s Will, 165 N.E.2d 561, 562 
(N.Y. 1960). For additional references, see Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1128–29 & nn.215, 218. 
 93. On the potential relevance of this variable, see Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1134 n.229. 
 94. In Kentucky, bequests to persons who would comprise the testator’s heirs do not adeem, 
whereas bequests to other persons do adeem. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.360 (LexisNexis 1999). 
 95. Would the typical testator distinguish ex ante the testamentary consequences of voluntary 
alienation of property from involuntary or accidental alienation, for example? On this distinction, see 
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 8.1, at 318–19 (3d 
ed. 2001); Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1130–31 & n.222. 
 96. Under the Uniform Probate Code, beneficiaries receive any property that the testator acquired 
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Probate Code takes a stab at the problem, carving out a number of 
exceptions from the traditional doctrine of ademption by extinction, but 
again without the guidance of empirical data.97 
In most jurisdictions, the rules of lapse and ademption take effect 
unless overridden by contingency clauses in the will itself. Other evidence 
of probable intent is inadmissible.98 Yet lawmakers have not followed this 
course with spotless consistency: in one other (relatively rare) instance of 
impossibility, they do admit other evidence. If a testator makes a 
conditional bequest, and the condition proves impossible to carry out, 
“impossibility . . . excuses lack of performance if, and only if, this result is 
 
 
“as a replacement,” for specifically bequeathed property that is lost or disposed of—thus construing 
specific bequests as, in effect, generic bequests. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(5), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 51 
(Supp. 2008). 
 97. Id. § 2-606. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1130–35. A related 
problem arises where the satisfaction of creditors’ claims against the testator (which take priority over 
bequests) leaves insufficient funds in the estate to carry out the estate plan in its entirety. In that event, 
under the doctrine of abatement, debts are satisfied first by reducing residuary bequests; then, if 
necessary, by reducing general bequests (of amounts, typically money) pro rata; then, if necessary, by 
reducing specific bequests (of items) pro rata. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902(a). The Commissioners 
submit, again without evidence, that this traditional order of abatement “may be regarded as 
approximating what testators generally want.” Id. § 3-902 cmt. Yet, when instead reducing bequests to 
satisfy tax claims or the spouse’s elective share, the Commissioners follow a different order of 
abatement, taking a proportional share from all beneficiaries. Id. §§ 2-207(b), 3-9A-104(1).  
 98. The Uniform Probate Code is exceptional, opening the door even to ex post declaratory 
evidence: beneficiaries receive a pecuniary devise equal in value to specifically bequeathed property 
that is lost or disposed of if “ademption would be inconsistent with the testator’s manifested plan of 
distribution or [if] at the time the will was made, the date of disposition or otherwise [i.e., at a later 
time?] the testator did not intend ademption of the devise.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(6). This 
provision has not been adopted in a single jurisdiction, however. A prior version of the provision made 
a presumption against ademption “unless the facts and circumstances indicated that ademption of the 
devise was intended . . . or . . . is consistent with the testator’s manifested plan of distribution”—again 
opening the door to extrinsic evidence. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(6), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 176 (1998) 
(pre-1997 Article 2) (adopted in 4 jurisdictions: Colo., Mich., Mont. and Utah). See also UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-601 (“In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, the rules of construction 
[for lapse and ademption] control the construction of a will.”) (adopted in 11 jurisdictions). This 
provision could be read to allow consideration of extrinsic evidence; but because it is supposed “to 
align the statutory rules of construction . . . with those established at common law,” id. § 2-601 cmt., 
which currently bars extrinsic evidence, 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE 
LAW OF WILLS § 50.1, at 71–72, §§ 54.14–.15 (rev. ed. 2005); Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1128–29, the 
provision will admit of multiple interpretations. This provision also does not cover the doctrine of 
abatement, but the separate section covering that subject allows a court to deviate from the statutory 
order of abatement if it would defeat “the express or implied purpose of [a] devise.” UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 3-902(a) (emphasis added). Although the language here is again frustratingly vague, it could 
be read to allow a court to consider non-declaratory extrinsic evidence. See id. § 3-902 cmt. By 
comparison, the Code makes no allowance for consideration of extrinsic evidence in connection with 
abatement to satisfy tax claims, see id. § 3-9A-104(1), nor in connection with abatement to satisfy the 
spouse’s elective share, unless a seemingly superfluous adverb connotes greater latitude: “liability . . . 
is equitably apportioned among the [beneficiaries] . . . in proportion to the value of their interests.” Id. 
§ 2-207(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2-207 cmt. (failing to address the meaning of this phrase). 
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the appropriately ascertained intent” of the testator.99 In this situation, the 
court is free to “ascertain” intent by examining extrinsic and other intrinsic 
evidence.100 
But for its rarity, the problem of impossible conditions is structurally 
analogous to lapse and ademption. Here again, “transferors do not have in 
mind the contingency that impossibility may prevent . . . performance,” 
leading us to inquire hypothetically “what [their] intent would have been 
had [they] . . . anticipated the impossibility.”101 Whether the greater 
likelihood (but not assurance) of intent effectuation via case-by-case 
assessment of evidence merits the administrative cost is hard to say. The 
easier point to make is that lawmakers ought to treat all of these problems 
symmetrically. 
B. Other Changed Circumstances 
We are left, finally, with changed circumstances that neither disable the 
testator from revising the will nor render the estate plan impossible by its 
terms to carry out. Whether lawmakers should update an estate plan by 
implication of such circumstances when the testator has not lifted a finger 
to amend the will is ultimately the most interesting—and most 
neglected—question we have before us. And, theoretically, we can 
imagine a range of responses. 
The formalistic move is to give effect to the literal terms of the will. 
Circumstances change every day of our lives. Lawmakers may reasonably 
require testators to execute a codicil to reflect a change of mind, at least 
when nothing stands in the way of their doing so. Insistence on formal 
execution of revisions eases the task of verifying the substance and finality 
of testamentary intent. At any rate, if testators have gone to the trouble of 
executing an initial will, lawmakers have some cause to assume that 
testators will update the will if and when it suits them to do so.102 
 
 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.2 (1983).  
 100. Id. § 5.2 cmts. c–h & reporter’s note 4. Nevertheless, ex post declarations are inadmissible:  
Where impossibility is offered as an excuse for non-performance, the construction process 
required under the stated rule is an appropriate inquiry, not as to what the transferor actually 
intended, but as to what his intent would have been had he known of or anticipated the 
impossibility at the time he imposed the restraint.  
Id. § 5.2 cmt. c. 
 101. Id. § 5.2 cmt. c. 
 102. See Aten v. Tobias, 220 P. 196, 202 (Kan. 1923) (“[T]he testator must necessarily have 
thought of the consequences . . . unless he bestirred himself to alter the testamentary disposition 
already made of his personalty. But the testator was content to let it stand as made, and the courts may 
not meddle with it.”). 
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The alternative antiformalistic move would allow courts to weigh the 
effects that changed circumstances have on a testator’s intent and to 
implement that reading even in want of a codicil. The virtue of this 
approach is its flexibility “amidst the endless variety of human affairs,”103 
recognizing that, for whatever reason, testators may lose sight of their 
estate plans. Its vice, though, is the danger that courts will fail accurately 
to reconstruct intent due to error or fraud, coupled with the potential 
administrative cost when every will is subject to such reconstruction. 
As a matter of law, nearly all jurisdictions reject the antiformalistic 
move.104 “[A] court may [not] wander from the actual words of a will into 
the region of conjecture as to what it is reasonable to suppose the testatrix 
would have done had she contemplated a certain event happening,”105 one 
state supreme court opined, emphasizing the uncertainty of the enterprise: 
“A court is not free to roam such unfenced fields of speculation.”106 Other 
courts have deplored the idea.107  
 
 
 103. Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506, 512 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (Kent, C.) (explaining the evolution 
of the doctrine of implied revocation, discussed below, in the English courts). 
 104. New Jersey is exceptional in this regard; its “doctrine of probable intent” appears to permit 
this sort of inquiry. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33.1 (West 2007); In re Estate of Tateo, 768 A.2d 243, 
246–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). For foreign legislation recreating this doctrine, see Wills 
Act, 1968, AUSTL. CAP. TERR. LAWS § 12A(2) (1991).  
 105. In re Grave’s Estate, 457 P.2d 71, 77 (Kan. 1969). 
 106. Id. For a recent reiteration, see In re Estate of Nash, 164 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Tex. App. 2005), 
aff’d 220 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. 2007). The Commissioners agree that except in enumerated situations, “a 
change of circumstances does not revoke a will or any part of it.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 
(amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 154 (1998); see also id. § 2-804(f). Although the Third Restatement 
includes a cause of action to reform a will on the ground of mistake, changes of circumstance are 
excluded from the scope of the doctrine. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. h & illus. 3 (1999).  
 107. In the language of one court: 
Were we to . . . inquire into the circumstances of a man’s estate, at the time of making his 
will, and of his death, we should find innumerable instances in which the alteration has been 
so great, that a prudent man would have altered his will, and part of his family has been 
reduced to great distress by his not doing it. But it is better that individuals should be 
distressed, than the freedom of disposition by last will invaded. . . . Once [we] establish the 
judicial habit of examining the situation of a man’s fortune or family, and revoking his will 
[by inference] . . . and no man’s will is safe. 
Wogan v. Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle 141, 144 (Pa. 1824). “Were it otherwise, the statute of wills would 
be virtually abolished.” Sneed v. Ewing, 28 Ky. 460, 473–74 (1831); Hertrais v. Moore, 88 N.E.2d 
909, 912 (Mass. 1949) (“It would be a serious matter to invalidate a will because of a supposed change 
of intention.”); Hoitt v. Hoitt, 3 A. 604, 614, 616 (N.H. 1886) (such a rule would “inevitably invite 
litigation and ‘produce infinite uncertainty and delay in the settlement of estates.’”); Brush, 4 Johns. 
Ch. at 519 (Kent, C.) (“It might be dangerous and lead to loose speculations . . . running the hazard of 
substituting [the court’s] will for that of the testator.”); White v. Barford, (1815) 105 Eng. Rep. 739, 
739 (K.B.) (“But where are we to stop? Is the rule to vary with every change which constitutes a new 
situation . . . ?”); LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A 
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 53 cmt. (1946) (“Such a doctrine introduces an undesirable element of 
uncertainty into . . . the validity of a . . . will.”). 
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Still and all, no jurisdiction follows the formalistic move scrupulously 
either. At least after erecting fences, lawmakers have ventured out into the 
field of speculation, amending an estate plan in discrete situations that 
vary from state to state. Three triggering events predominate: where the 
execution of a will is followed by divorce, by marriage, or by childbirth.108 
In most jurisdictions, if a testator makes a will and subsequently marries, 
the new spouse receives an intestate share under the premarital will; 
likewise, if a testator makes a will and subsequently gets divorced, the 
former spouse loses his or her bequest under the predissolution will; 
finally, if a testator makes a will and subsequently becomes a parent, the 
new child receives an intestate share under the prenatal will.109 
These rules effect what is known, rather deceptively, as implied 
revocation (or alternatively, revocation by operation of law).110 In truth, 
the testator performs no action that is intended, implicitly or explicitly, to 
revoke the estate plan in these situations; lawmakers simply reckon that 
these dramatic changes of circumstance will likely precipitate a shift of 
testamentary intent. Nearly two centuries ago, Chancellor Kent submitted 
that implied revocations “are founded upon the reasonable presumption of 
an alteration of the testator’s mind, arising from circumstances since the 
making of the will, producing a change in his previous obligations and 
duties.”111 Now, as then, courts defend the doctrine of implied revocation 
as “anticipat[ing] that, upon undergoing a fundamental change in family 
composition . . . [testators] would most likely intend to provide for their 
new family members, and/or revoke prior provisions made for their ex-
spouses.”112 
 
 
 108. For several additional triggering mechanisms peculiar to particular states, see infra note 149. 
 109. Although today these doctrines are ordinarily statutory, their roots lie in English common and 
ecclesiastical law, with still deeper roots in Roman law. W.A. Graunke & J.H. Beuscher, The Doctrine 
of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 WIS. L. 
REV. 387, 387–94 (1930). For modern discussions, see 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 98, §§ 21.86–
.111; McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 95, §§ 3.5–.6, 5.4. Statutes cover predissolution wills in 48 
states, premarital wills in 34 states, and prenatal wills in 47 states. Although implied revocation 
remains a common law doctrine in Mississippi, Hinders v. Hinders, 828 So.2d 1235, 1241 (Miss. 
2002), in most states today the statutes operate exclusively.  
 110. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 88, at 269; Graunke & Beuscher, supra note 109, at 387. 
 111. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *521 (Oliver Wendell Holmes ed., 12th 
ed. 1896) (1826–30); see also Brush, 4 Johns. Ch. at 511, 518 (Kent, C.) (putting this theory into 
practice). 
 112. Coughlin v. Bd. of Admin., Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 199 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287 (Ct. App. 
1984). The same rationale appears explicitly in scores of cases, e.g., In re Estate of Rodriguez, 160 
P.3d 679, 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007), and dipping back to the nineteenth century, e.g., Baacke v. 
Baacke, 69 N.W. 303, 304 (Neb. 1896). The Commissioners likewise defend the doctrines as serving 
to rework an estate plan in the manner “the testator would want . . . if he or she had thought about the 
relationship of his or her old will to the new situation.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 cmt., 8 pt.1 
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Implied revocation nevertheless has an underside. Even if we can 
establish the empirical likelihood that testators would respond to a 
particular change of circumstance with a particular revision of the estate 
plan, we cannot surmise that amending a will on its author’s behalf 
effectuates intent with the same likelihood. The issue is not whether 
someone would probably want to revise a will following a consequential 
event, but whether someone who has not done so would probably want to 
do so. And that, on reflection, is a separate question.113 
1. Error Costs 
Consider the case of a testator who executes a will in favor of his or her 
spouse and the two subsequently divorce. If we decide whether to leave 
standing or revise the will on the basis of the likelihood that the testator’s 
intent changed, we minimize transaction costs. But there exists a second 
consideration, which has in fact loomed larger in judicial discussions. If 
lawmakers leave standing a will that most testators intend to revise, some 
will still neglect to act, out of inadvertence or procrastination.114 These 
testators bear not a transaction cost, but an error cost. On the other hand, if 
lawmakers invoke the doctrine of implied revocation to amend the will, 
other testators may leave it in place not because they are happy with the 
doctrine as applied, but because they are ignorant of what legal effect 
divorce had on the estate plan, mistakenly assuming it remains in effect as 
before, and intending that result. These testators also bear an error cost. If 
legal ignorance of this sort is more common than procrastination, we 
minimize error costs by imposing the default rule not that most testators 
 
 
U.L.A. 133 (1998). At the same time, a few courts rationalize implied revocations as implementing 
social norms: “Strong public policy upholding the institution of marriage prohibits a man from 
inheriting from a woman whom he . . . divorced.” In re Estate of Pekol, 499 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986); In re Estate of Forrest, 706 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing to Pekol). For an 
argument against default rules based on social norms, in contradistinction to probable intent, see 
Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1046–52; see also id. 1042–46 (on the limited potential efficiency of social 
defaults). 
 113. For a rare judicial recognition, see Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) (“Doubtless many, perhaps most, divorced men desire to disinherit their 
wives. . . . What we are considering, however, is the probable intent of those divorced men who do not 
destroy their wills.”). 
 114. “The statutes . . . anticipate that [testators] themselves will often fail to . . . revoke, not out of 
conscious intent, but simply from a lack of attentiveness.” Coughlin, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 287–88. 
“Legislatures . . . acknowledged the lax tendencies of the public concerning the making or reviewing 
of wills . . . [and] took a parens patriae approach to protect our citizens from the repercussions of their 
probable inaction.” In re Estate of Forrest, 706 N.E.2d at 1045 (paraphrasing In re Estate of Knospe, 
626 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703 (Sur. Ct. 1995)); In re Estate of Jackson, 194 P.3d 1269, 1274 (Okla. 2008) 
(the statute “is an assurance . . . [against] unintentional[] omi[ssions] from a will.”). 
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prefer, but that most presuppose. This we may dub an error-minimizing 
default. 
Orthodox default rule theory posits that majoritarian default rules are 
efficient; but orthodox theory, which developed in connection with 
commercial transactions, assumes that contracting parties are repeat 
players who are informed (or can efficiently become informed) about the 
applicable default rule.115 Information costs pose a more serious obstacle 
for testators, for whom estate planning is a one-time (or at best infrequent) 
activity.116 What is more, in situations where testators already have an 
estate plan in place, and where the consequential event does not prompt 
consultation with counsel, they may not even be aware of the need to 
become informed—they may simply assume that the estate plan they 
formally executed remains in effect until they see fit to change it, thereby 
magnifying information costs.117 In the Appendix, below, we develop an 
 
 
 115. The instant analysis jumps off from an earlier inquiry of mine into the impact of information 
costs on default rule theory. Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1041–42. 
 116. Empirical studies have found widespread ignorance of the rules of intestacy, by analogy: 
Although there is a demonstrated interest within the general population about the distribution 
of property at death, . . . an overwhelming majority of the citizenry are not aware of the 
present pattern of distribution provided under the intestate succession statutes. Therefore, they 
do not rely intentionally on those statutes to dispose of their property. Thirty percent of the 
respondents admitted they did not know the identity of their potential heirs and 64 percent of 
those who thought they knew were in error. 
Mary Louise Fellows et al., An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 
717, 723 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Fellows et al., Empirical Study]. For 
comparable findings, see Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at 
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 340 
[hereinafter Fellows et al., Public Attitudes] (55.4% in error); see also id. at 340 n.73 (observing that 
no respondent was aware of “subtleties in the statute”); Joel R. Glucksman, Intestate Succession in 
New Jersey: Does It Conform to Popular Expectations?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 262–66 
(1976). 
 117. The point has not entirely escaped notice by lawmakers. One judge criticized the invocation 
of a doctrine of implied revocation to override a will: “It is fair to observe that people tend to do the 
things they really want to do, and that inaction generally signifies contentment or at worst indecision,” 
Luff, 359 F.2d at 240 (Leventhal, J., dissenting), while also noting the problem of legal ignorance: 
A man who intends to disinherit a divorced wife is more likely to speak up to his counsel at 
once, and have it taken care of. A man who has decided not to disinherit his divorced wife is 
less likely to bring the matter up even assuming he is aware of the little-known statutory 
technique of republication of a will. 
Id. at 242. Another court defended its limited version of the doctrine of implied revocation, see infra 
text at notes 145–46, as “[meeting] the expectations of those involved . . . in most cases.” Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 689 P.2d 46, 52 (Wash. 1984); see also In re Estate of Blanchard, 218 N.W.2d 
37, 39 (Mich. 1974) (observing that in the event of divorce followed by remarriage a testator “would 
see no necessity to republish” a predissolution will). Also showing awareness of the problem, 
legislators in California have mandated that petitions for, and judgments of, dissolution of marriage 
must each contain a warning notice: “Dissolution . . . of your marriage may automatically cancel your 
spouse’s rights under your will. . . . If these are not the results that you want, you must change your 
will . . . to reflect your actual wishes.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 2024 (Deering 2006). See also infra note 
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economic model to prove the potential efficiency of error-minimizing 
defaults, and to ascertain the conditions that must exist for them to achieve 
greater efficiency than majoritarian defaults—a possibility not previously 
recognized or explored in the default rule literature.118 
And so we face a quandary. Whether lawmakers take it upon 
themselves following a consequential event to revise a testator’s will or 
leave it be, the intent of some testators will be frustrated—and without 
data, we cannot predict which option is the lesser evil. Nor is this an easy 
matter to investigate empirically. All of the extant studies of inheritance 
patterns and preferences rely either on random surveys (asking either 
factual or hypothetical questions) or on probate records. These can serve to 
illuminate probable intent, but they are uninformative on the distribution 
of error costs. The only way to investigate those costs is to develop a data 
set of actual testators who retain their original wills following 
consequential events of a particular sort, and then to poll testators 
concerning why they have left their wills unchanged. In point of fact, no 
such study has ever been conducted. The doctrine of implied revocation 
rests upon a flimsy foundation of evidence and analysis. 
2. Friction Redux  
There exists, however, an alternative approach to the problem at hand. 
That is to acknowledge a doctrine of implied revocation but confine it to 
cases where we have less room for doubt that a testator’s failure to amend 
his or her estate plan following a consequential event was unintentional. 
Either of two factors, structurally speaking, can retard the process of 
testation and thereby reintroduce friction into the system—not disabling 
friction, to be sure, but enough to make responsiveness to changed 
conditions unlikely. These factors we may label, respectively, ripeness and 
lag.  
a. Ripeness 
Testators may intend to amend an estate plan but nevertheless fail to do 
so, because the time is not yet ripe. We can identify several situations 
 
 
162. But cf. Johnston v. Laird, 52 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Wyo. 1935) (“Would it not be more logical to 
believe that after his . . . divorce, . . . if he still desired this will to control the disposition of his 
property, he would have published and redeclared the same, so that his intention could not be 
questioned?”) (quoting In re Gilmore’s Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 761 (Sur. Ct. 1932)). 
 118. For a taxonomy of default rules and their functions, see Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule 
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390–91 (1993). 
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where estate planning might appear premature even though testamentary 
intent has already changed. The clearest case is conception. A parent-to-be 
may wish to bequeath to an unborn child. Still, the parent might postpone 
revision of the estate plan until the child is born and named. Were the 
parent to die unexpectedly prior to the child’s birth, or during childbirth, 
the parent’s failure to amend the will could trace to this variant of friction. 
Of course, a testator can anticipate childbirth by creating a class gift, or by 
leaving a bequest to an embryonic child.119 But a testator’s failure to 
consider the risk of premature death is entirely plausible, 
psychologically.120 In this circumstance, a stronger case appears for an 
implied revision, assuming it conforms to the typical testator’s intent.121 
Another occurrence potentially causing testamentary intent to change, 
yet where estate planning might seem premature, is marital engagement. 
Persons whose relationships are sufficiently close that they plan marriage 
may already intend to bequeath something to each other.122 Whereas 
nothing prevents fiancés from amending their wills immediately, this 
transitional phase of the relationship might seem too fleeting to merit 
planning. The couple might understandably wait until the main event, 
disregarding the possibility of a premarital death.123 Here again, we have 
 
 
 119. E.g., Warner v. Beach, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 162, 162 (1855) (including a contingency for 
whether the beneficiary in utero was a son or a daughter).  
 120. Terror management theory leads persons to underestimate this risk. For a discussion and 
application of terror management theory in a different context, see Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1049–51; 
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 121. The common law failed to distinguish between beneficiaries born after a will was executed 
and those who were also born posthumously, applying the same doctrine of implied revision to each. 
C.H. SHERRIN & R.F.D. BARLOW, WILLIAMS’ LAW RELATING TO WILLS 528–30 (4th ed. 1974); 
Belton v. Summer, 12 So. 371, 373 (Fla. 1893); Warner, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) at 163–64 (dictum). 
Whether modern statutes reserving a share for children under prenatal wills protect posthumously born 
children depends on whether an additional statute treats children in gestation at the testator’s death as 
living at that time. Under the Uniform Probate Code, such a provision used to exist, but in 2008 it was 
amended to cover only “intestate succession, homestead allowance, and exempt property.” Compare 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104(a)(2) (amended 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/upc/2008amends.htm, with id. § 2-108, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 87 (pre-2008 Article 2). 
 122. Although no empirical study addresses this issue, it has arisen indirectly, and anecdotally, in 
connection with prenuptial gifts. In New York, if either party voluntarily breaks an engagement, the 
law creates a “strong presumption . . . that any gifts made during an engagement period are given 
solely in consideration of marriage, and are recoverable if the marriage does not materialize.” 
Friedman v. Geller, 368 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (Civ. Ct. 1975). Nevertheless, when a donor died prior to 
marriage, one court denied recovery to the donor’s family on the ground of implicit intent: “I firmly 
believe that had [the donor] thought of these consequences he would have intended that in the event of 
his untimely death [the donee] should keep the ring as a symbol of his love and affection.” Cohen v. 
Bayside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 309 N.Y.S.2d 980, 983 (Sur. Ct. 1970). 
 123. “[I]t is improbable that at the time of the [engagement] gift either [party] gave a thought to 
the consequences that would arise in the event of the death of one of the parties.” Cohen, 309 N.Y.S.2d 
at 983. See also supra notes 73, 120 and accompanying text. 
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cause to apply a doctrine of implied revision in accord with typical intent 
(once established), although no jurisdiction has yet pioneered such a rule.  
A third scenario raising the problem of ripeness is more complex and 
requires elaboration. Consider the case of a testator who makes an inter 
vivos gift to a beneficiary who is also designated to receive a bequest 
under the testator’s will. If the bequest comprises a specific item which the 
testator gifts to the beneficiary inter vivos, then it is adeemed by 
extinction.124 But suppose the bequest comprises a general amount of cash. 
Is the gift given in lieu of the bequest and hence subtracted from the 
amount left to the beneficiary at death (thereby accelerating 
distribution)?125 Or is the gift independent of the bequest and hence added 
to the amount the beneficiary receives at death? 
At common law, the applicable doctrine is known as ademption by 
satisfaction. It provides that whether a gift is held to satisfy or augment a 
bequest depends on the testator’s intent, as gleaned from declarations 
contemporaneous with the gift.126 Whereas a rebuttable presumption of 
intent to satisfy bequests applies to children, a rebuttable presumption of 
intent to augment bequests covers all other beneficiaries.127 Under the 
Uniform Probate Code, however, a presumption of intent to augment 
applies to all beneficiaries and is rebuttable only by a contemporaneous 
writing by the benefactor or a written acknowledgment by the 
beneficiary.128  
On first sight, either approach appears anomalous. If we conceptualize 
a gift as just another event occurring during the hiatus between the 
execution of an estate plan and death, then declarations of intent not 
expressed in the will should be inadmissible, just as in connection with the 
other intervening events already discussed.129 What makes the case 
different, however, is that a gift is not a mere change of circumstance, but 
also a gratuitous transfer—that is, a legally performative act. Whereas 
 
 
 124. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 88, at 413. See supra text at note 91. 
 125. In such event, to recall an old common-law maxim, “the testator . . . becomes his own 
executor.” Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35, 57 (N.Y. 1850). 
 126. On the common law of ademption by satisfaction, see SHERRIN & BARLOW, supra note 121, 
at 242–53; Barney Barstow, Ademption by Satisfaction, 6 WIS. L. REV. 217 passim (1931). 
 127. SHERRIN & BARLOW, supra note 121, at 243, 245–46; Barstow, supra note 126, at 218–22. 
The presumption for children only applies to substantial and extraordinary gifts, thus excluding 
periodic gifts for support. SHERRIN & BARLOW, supra note 121, at 243–44; Barstow, supra note 126, 
at 121–22. 
 128. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-609 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 179 (1998). Half the states 
track the Uniform Probate Code on these points. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.4 statutory note (1999). 
 129. Academic commentators have not assayed this anomaly. For a judicial recognition of it, but 
failing to address its basis in policy, see Rhodes v. Kebke, 167 S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tenn. 1943).  
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lawmakers are ordinarily chary of unformalized declarations of intent, 
given the uncertainty of their purposefulness and finality, when they 
accompany a legally performative act—here, formal delivery of a gift—
declarations become more credible. Hence, lawmakers allow donors orally 
to declare the terms of a gift (viz. whether it is temporary or permanent, 
conditional or unconditional) when donors deliver them.130 Ademption by 
satisfaction represents an extension of this policy. 
What presumptions should apply when benefactors make gifts to will 
beneficiaries is a question as yet unexplored in any empirical study. The 
Commissioners claim that “[m]ost inter-vivos transfers today are intended 
to be absolute gifts or are carefully integrated into a total estate plan.”131 Is 
that a fact? No references accompany the assertion, so it would appear to 
be mere conjecture—one, incidentally, that commentators dispute.132  
The Commissioners add that “[i]f the donor intends that any transfer 
during the donor’s lifetime be deducted from the donee’s share of his 
estate, the donor may . . . execute a will so providing.”133 Yet there 
remains one situation where such action is subject to friction. Consider 
gifts given upon milestones. A parent may make a practice of giving 
substantial gifts to his or her children upon their attaining a certain age, or 
upon marriage, or upon the launching of their careers. If all goes to plan, 
they will receive equal treatment once the last of the children reaches the 
milestone—before that time, the gratuitous transfer to the last child is 
 
 
 130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.2 & cmt. a, illus. 1-4 (1983). 
Similarly, contemporaneous declarations are admissible to clarify the legal ramifications of revocation 
by act. Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1089–96. 
 131. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 5.4 cmt. b 
(chaired by the same reporter, and repeating this claim). 
 132. Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate 
Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 915–16 (1992) (questioning whether the presumption is appropriate for 
large gifts); see Walters v. Stewart, 588 S.E.2d 248, 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Stewart 
v. Walters, 602 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 2004) (finding evidence that a $50,000 gift to a child was intended to 
satisfy a bequest, although the testator failed to say so in a contemporaneous writing); see also Mary L. 
Fellows, Concealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The Advancements Doctrine 
and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REV. 671, 704–06 (1984) (criticizing the analogous Code 
provision covering gifts by intestate benefactors). Empirical studies show that most testators bequeath 
equal amounts to children irrespective of relative need, a tropism that one study attributes to a desire to 
signal equality of affection. B. Douglas Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, Bequests as Signals: An 
Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle, 111 J. POL. ECON. 733 passim (2003). Although other 
studies find that inter vivos gifts (by comparison) are distributed unequally, id. at 734, these studies 
fail to explore whether donors prefer that gifts satisfy bequests. The instant study posits that parents 
make unequal gifts because, unlike bequests, they can keep them secret from non-recipient children 
and thereby maintain the image of equality of affection. Id. at 735, 752–53. Yet large gifts are 
probably harder to hide from siblings than small ones, suggesting that parents should prefer to equalize 
total sizable transfers during life and at death, assuming this model is correct.  
 133. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 cmt. 
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premature. But what if the parent dies ahead of the milestone? Of course, 
the parent could provide for that possibility under a will, but he or she may 
again fail to anticipate an untimely death. 
The Commissioners appear to have given no thought to this scenario. It 
did not escape another body of lawmakers who set their minds to the 
problem a bit earlier in time. Under the Code of Hammurabi—the 
Babylonian lex scripta dating to the third millennium BC—we find that 
[i]f a man has made a gift . . . to his son . . . then, after the father has 
gone to his fate, when the brothers divide he shall retain the father’s 
present which he has given him over and above the equal part that 
he shares in the possessions of his paternal house.134  
In other words, the Babylonians—like the Commissioners—declined to 
apply a doctrine of ademption by satisfaction to children. But that was not 
the end of the matter: 
If a man has married wives to the children he has had, but has not 
married a wife to an infant son; then, after the father has gone to his 
fate, when the brethren share the possessions of the paternal house, 
they shall give silver for a bride-price to their infant brother who 
has not married a wife, besides his share; and he shall be married to 
a wife.135 
And so, the ancient Babylonians offered up a refinement of the doctrine of 
ademption by satisfaction that we should hearken to today—along with a 
delightful reminder that the problems of inheritance law are well and truly 
eternal ones. 
b. Lag 
A more general problem arises out of friction that operates to slow, 
rather than to halt, the estate planning process. Testators do not revise their 
wills overnight. They may react sluggishly to changed circumstances. If 
they die nearly simultaneously with consequential events, as we have seen, 
friction becomes overwhelming. But even if they die shortly thereafter, 
their opportunity to respond to changed circumstances is limited, and the 
probability that their unresponsiveness was inadvertent increases. With 
each passing day, however, this risk recedes, while the likelihood that they 
left their wills unchanged on purpose creeps up commensurately. 
 
 
 134. THE HAMMURABI CODE § 165, at 32 (Chilperic Edwards ed. 1921) (c. 2084-81 BC). 
 135. Id. § 166, at 32–33. 
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This observation suggests a variation on the theme of implied 
revocation. Lawmakers could give effect to the doctrine but confine it to 
an interval of time following the consequential event—hence creating only 
a temporary presumption. Temporary presumptions comprise an unusual 
structural form in our law, although hardly an unprecedented one. Similar 
in spirit is a rule found in the Uniform Probate Code rendering ademption 
by extinction inapplicable to bequests of property “sold . . . by a 
conservator . . . for an incapacitated principal . . . [unless] it was 
adjudicated that the testator’s incapacity ceased and the testator survived 
the adjudication by one year.”136 The longer the testator who has recovered 
capacity fails to respond to the conservator’s action by amending the estate 
plan, the stronger the inference that the testator approves of the 
consequences.137 Determining the proper duration for an implied 
revocation depends on a finding of the typical lag in estate planning 
following consequential events, a space of time that could vary with the 
state of health of the testator,138 or with the sort of event at issue, 
depending on how distracting or debilitating it tends typically to 
become,139 and on how distantly it can be anticipated.140 
The idea of temporally defining the doctrine of implied revocation has 
surfaced now and again in the past. In his sixteenth-century treatise on 
wills, Henry Swinburne hinted at a caveat to what was then the general 
rule that wills executed prior to childbirth remained effective as written: 
And albeit the testator after the making of the testament have a 
childe borne unto him, I suppose that the testament is not presumed 
thereby to be revoked, especially if the testator did live a long time 
 
 
 136. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(b), (d). Temporary presumptions also arise in other fields of 
law including, for example, bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1) (2006). 
 137. For a criticism of this provision, see Hirsch, supra note 15, at 1130–32. 
 138. See In re Estate of McQuay, 335 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (noting that illness 
can interfere with estate planning); Curley v. Giltrop, 496 N.E.2d 224, 225 (N.Y. 1986) (same). 
 139. See Gay C. Kitson & Leslie A. Morgan, The Multiple Consequences of Divorce: A Decade 
Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 913–15 (1990) (linking divorce with psychological or physical 
morbidity). 
 140. The high court of Tennessee observed:  
A divorce does not come as an earthquake, without warning, to suddenly break apart a 
marriage. . . . The parties have months in which to contemplate and consider all the 
ramifications of a divorce. . . . In such a situation the number of days after the divorce is 
granted is far less significant and should not give rise to a presumption [of revocation]. 
Bowers v. Bowers, 637 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tenn. 1982); see also Marilyn Coleman et al., Divorce and 
Postdivorce Relationships, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 157, 158–
59 (Anita L. Vangelisti & Daniel Perlman eds. 2006) (surveying the literature on sociological 
processes preceding and leading toward divorce). But does not ripeness once again come into play 
here, delaying revision of a will when divorce is contemplated but not yet certain to occur? 
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after the birth of the childe, and might have revoked the testament, 
and did not.141 
The idea has also flickered in the American case law, appearing 
primarily in dicta. In a case of first impression in Minnesota, the high 
court of the state had to determine the effect of divorce on a testator’s 
predissolution will. In this instance, the testator had died just thirty days 
after the divorce was granted. In holding the bequest to the former spouse 
void, the court cabined its ruling: 
Whether the fact that the testator in such a case permits his will to 
remain unchanged . . . for a number of years after the divorce and 
settlement would militate against the conclusion of implied 
revocation we need not determine. Testator in this case died within 
30 days after the settlement, and his failure expressly to [re]voke 
within that time certainly creates no inference that he intended his 
will to continue in force.142 
Around the same time, the high court of Pennsylvania faced the issue 
raised hypothetically in the Minnesota case and concluded along the same 
lines: 
The divorce was granted eight years before [the testator’s] death 
. . . . He had ample time and opportunity to consider . . . [changing] 
the [life insurance] policy, but death came to him without his having 
made a change in the beneficiary . . . . Under the circumstances it is 
evident that he never intended or desired to exercise his power.143 
Other American courts have adverted to this distinction,144 but it never 
crystallized into a rule in any state until 1984. In that year, the high court 
 
 
 141. HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS 269 (photo. 
reprint 1978) (1590) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 142. In re Hall’s Estate, 119 N.W. 219, 222 (Minn. 1909). 
 143. Brown v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 57 A. 176, 177–78 (Pa. 1904). 
 144. See Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492, 504 (1881) (observing that since the testator “lived 
nearly five years after the divorce making no changes in his will, . . . the conclusion is well nigh 
irresistible that he did not intend to deprive his former wife of the provision he had made for her.”); 
Trueblood v. Roberts, 732 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (Sievers, J., concurring) (“[T]he key 
collateral fact here is that [the decedent] did not in the 11 years after the divorce . . . change the 
beneficiary on his policy.”); Bowdlear v. Bowdlear, 112 Mass. 184, 186 (1873) (making a like 
observation); Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298, 305 (Ohio 1875) (same); In re Arnold’s Estate, 110 
P.2d 204, 205 (Nev. 1941) (same); Murphy v. Markis, 130 A. 840, 842 (N.J. Ch. 1925), aff’d 132 A. 
923 (N.J. 1926) (same); In re Silberstein’s Will, 108 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (same). Cf. In re 
Estate of McQuay, 335 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (testator “died seventeen days after the 
divorce was granted, during which time he was ill and could hardly be expected to have changed his 
will. Perhaps this is a portion of the circumstances which need to be noted.”). One court contrasted the 
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of Washington held that it would presume an intent to revoke a 
predissolution life insurance policy naming the divorced spouse as 
beneficiary if the dissolution decree indicated an intent to divest the 
former spouse of his or her rights as beneficiary, and if that intention was  
acted upon within a reasonable time after dissolution by formal 
execution of the change of beneficiary. If the intention is not acted 
upon within a reasonable time, the owner should be deemed to have 
decided to retain the named beneficiary as the one entitled to the 
proceeds.145 
Reasonability of lag time under this ruling could vary with the 
circumstances, but in no event could it exceed one year.146  
This rule died on the vine. The opinion was superseded in a matter of 
years by a statutory enactment of the more traditional, time-independent 
sort.147 Nevertheless, the rule, or some variation of it, merits serious 
contemplation and it could serve as a model in other situations as well. 
Newlywed testators, by extension, cannot be expected to revise their estate 
plans immediately—but once the sunsets of the honeymoon are over, the 
 
 
two situations: “[I]t cannot be said that this testator, who survived for many months after the divorce, 
lacked the opportunity to revoke the will in a manner provided by [law]. . . (cf. Matter of Ga Nun’s 
Estate . . . where the testator died one month after the divorce).” In re Estate of Torr, 186 N.Y.S.2d 
205, 208 (Sur. Ct. 1959) (citing In re Ga Nun’s Estate, 104 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sur. Ct. 1951)). In other 
cases, however, proximity to death has not entered into judicial discussions. See, e.g., Gartin v. Gartin, 
21 N.E.2d 289, 290 (Ill. 1939) (testator died within thirty days of divorce); In re Cabaniss’ Estate, 129 
P.2d 1003, 1004 (Okla. 1942) (testator died two months after divorce); Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Weathersfield, 621 P.2d 83, 84 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (insured died six days after divorce). Whereas two 
courts have affirmatively rejected a rule of implied revocation premised on proximity to death, 
Bowers, 637 S.W.2d at 457–58 (overruling appellate court which had sought to install such a rule 
covering the case of divorce); In re Group Life Ins. Proceeds of Mallory, 872 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. 
App. 1994) (rejecting argument made by appellants), a third court has affirmatively rejected the 
argument (made by appellant) that a rule of implied revocation should not apply when a testator 
survived annulment (held equivalent to divorce) for a long time without modifying his will. Johnston 
v. Laird, 52 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Wyo. 1935). 
 145. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 689 P.2d 46, 52 (Wash. 1984). 
 146. Id. One foreign jurisdiction where a rule of this sort exists today is the Republic of South 
Africa. By statute in that nation, bequests to a spouse are impliedly revoked upon divorce, but the 
presumption applies only if the testator dies within three months of the divorce. Wills Act 7 of 1953 s. 
2B (amended 1992). “In its report the [South African] Law Commission said that if a will was not 
amended within three months, it was arguable that the testator intended to benefit the former spouse 
after all.” M.C. Schoeman-Malan, Revocation of Wills by Changed Circumstances, in EXPLORING THE 
LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL, AND COMPARATIVE 141, 153 (Kenneth G.C. 
Reid et al. eds., 2007).  
 147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.07.010 (West Supp. 2003). Lawmakers enacted this statute in 
response to the decision in Wadsworth. On the legislative history, see Mearns v. Scharbach, 5 P.3d 29, 
33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). But cf. Henley v. Henley, 974 P.2d 362, 364 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) 
(suggesting that Wadsworth may retain some vitality). 
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assumption of changed intent could also sunset. So long as lawmakers 
confine implied revocation to a short interval of time around the 
consequential event, they need not concern themselves with the empirical 
complexities associated with error costs;148 they need simply to identify 
those situations where an event is statistically likely to transform intent. 
Indeed, empirical inquiry might well reveal a host of triggering events 
beyond the ones currently covered in most states by rules of implied 
revocation.149  
 
 
 148. For a mathematical proof of the insignificance of short-term error costs, see the Appendix. 
 149. Four categories of events merit investigation. (1) Changes of relationship: This category is 
the focus of the current laws of implied revocation. Lawmakers have lighted on marriage and divorce 
as triggering events, but do other events also change intent along this continuum? What about formal 
engagement? See supra note 122 and accompanying text. By the same token, what about broken 
engagement, if the testator executed a premarital will? By comparison, an implicit condition of 
marriage attaches to a prenuptial gift. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 31.2 cmt. c & illus. 5–9 (1983). What about permanent separation? Law reformers in New York 
considered applying the doctrine of implied revocation to instances of separation but decided that the 
case was insufficiently compelling. Samuel Hoffman, Revocation of Wills and Related Subjects, 32 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 32 (1965). In the Canadian province of British Columbia, however, a judicial decree 
of separation suffices to trigger an implied revocation. Wills Act, R.S.B.C. § 16(2) (1996). In a number 
of states, an abandoning or adulterous spouse forfeits inheritance rights, and in two instances the 
operative statutes could be read to cover bequests under wills, see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-2-14, 29-1-
2-15 (West Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (LexisNexis 1999), but the case law has 
construed the statutes more narrowly. Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601, 601–05 (Ky. 1930); see also 
Oliver v. Estate of Oliver, 554 N.E.2d 8, 9–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (issue not raised directly and prior 
to statutory amendment). By the same token, what about reconciliation following a separation? And 
should other changes of relationship also operate as triggering events? What about a bequest to a child 
whom the parent subsequently gives up for adoption (structurally analogous to divorce)? What about a 
bequest to an employee whose employment subsequently terminates?  
 (2) Wrongdoing: A beneficiary may harm the testator sufficiently to damage their relationship 
without formally changing it (and without causing the testator’s death, as discussed supra Part I.C.2). 
Should such harm trigger an implied revocation? In Louisiana, a beneficiary who is judicially 
determined to have attempted to murder the testator loses his or her bequest under the will, absent a 
finding of reconciliation or forgiveness. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 941, 943, 945 (2000). In Oregon, a 
beneficiary convicted of physically or financially abusing the testator loses his or her bequest under the 
will if the testator dies within five years of the conviction, but this forfeiture operates as a mandatory, 
not as a default, rule. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455(1), 112.465(1) (West 2005). See also CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 259 (Deering 2004) (abuser cannot recover via the will any damages stemming from 
abuse awarded to the testator’s estate); McDonald v. Carey, No. A113265, 2008 WL 4383876, at *25 
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2008) (construing this statute). Under early English law, implied revocation 
applied to any beneficiary who “become[s] enimie to the testator.” SWINBURNE, supra note 141, at 
286. And ought not these principles operate reciprocally—that is, does not a serious harm committed 
by the testator upon the beneficiary likewise signal a breakdown in their relationship that probably 
entails a wish to disinherit that beneficiary? See supra text at notes 61–62.  
 (3) Changes of status: Should a beneficiary’s conviction of a crime of moral turpitude trigger an 
implied revocation? Should a beneficiary’s insolvency or bankruptcy petition trigger an implied 
revocation? In cases of insolvency where a bankruptcy petition and discharge is likely to follow, 
inherited assets only benefit creditors of the beneficiary; even after bankruptcy, assets inherited within 
six months of the petition for relief flow back into the bankruptcy estate to satisfy creditors. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(5) (2006). For discussions raising the possibility of implied revocation in this connection, see 
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Alternatively, one could conceive a limited doctrine of implied 
revocation framed as a standard, granting courts power to reform any will 
in accord with the testator’s probable intent where a testator lacked a 
reasonable opportunity, in light of the facts, to update the estate plan in 
response to a significant change of circumstances.150 Such a power would 
solve the problem at hand in the most flexible way, allowing courts to 
consider every possible change of circumstance, which lawmakers cannot 
anticipate comprehensively, along with the varying frictions impeding vel 
non individual testators. So long as the doctrine only operates temporarily, 
it should produce less litigation and narrow the scope for judicial 
intervention. At the same time, such a standard would free courts from the 
disciplines of text and probability, raising the risk of judicial error. If most 
testators would prefer to avoid that risk, then the principal effect of such a 
rule would be to cause testators to override it by so providing in their 
wills, pointlessly increasing transaction costs.151 
3. Extrinsic Evidence 
Another issue raised in connection with presumptions of implied 
revocation is whether extrinsic evidence should be admissible to rebut 
them. Jurisdictions have long differed on this question.  
The policies at stake here are indistinguishable from those concerning 
instances of impossibility. To honor a testator’s declarations of intent 
under these conditions would undermine the requirements of will 
formality.152 On the other hand, extrinsic evidence can cast light on a 
 
 
Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 632–36 (1989); Adam J. 
Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the “Fresh Start”, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 237–
38 (1994).  
 (4) Changes of property: Courts have rejected claims of implied revocation on the ground of 
substantial changes in the value of a testator’s property, e.g., Aten v. Tobias, 220 P. 196, 202 (Kan. 
1923), although in scenarios where the will evidences an intent to equalize bequests that grow unequal 
due to fluctuating values, probable intent might be reconstructed with some assurance. See id. 
(dictum). 
 150. This formulation constitutes a dual standard: both its substantive and temporal coverage are 
fuzzy. Alternatively, the triggering events could be fuzzy within a fixed space of time; or the triggering 
events could be fixed, within a fuzzy space of time. The temporal limit on the proposed power 
distinguishes this rule from a broader power to reform wills on the basis of probable intent. See supra 
notes 103–04 and accompanying text.  
 151. Testators can opt out of default rules of implied revocation without reference to specific 
facts. Evans v. Palmour, 553 S.E.2d 585, 587 (Ga. 2001); see also Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1065–69 
(on the theory of discretionary default rules). 
 152. “Such proof would be tantamount to allowing parol declaration of intent . . . .” In re 
Torregano’s Estate, 352 P.2d 505, 513 (Cal. 1960). “Declarations made by the testator after the 
divorce . . . cannot . . . modify the effect of a state of facts which was at the time sufficient. To allow 
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testator’s preferences, even if it cannot illuminate them with crystal clarity. 
None of the events presently triggering implied revocation has so 
unequivocal an impact on intent that extrinsic evidence is superfluous.153 If 
lawmakers wish to minimize the litigation costs associated with admitting 
extrinsic evidence, as some opinions suggest,154 then the applicable 
statutes could identify specific badges of probable intent sufficient to 
overcome an inference of revocation—just as the statutes fix upon 
specific, extrinsic facts to create inferences of revocation in the first 
place—although these again would require empirical verification.155 
From the existing cases we can distill a number of recurring themes 
that hold promise as badges of probable intent. To wit: Was the will the 
testator executed prior to a consequential event made long before it 
occurred or near enough to it to allow the testator to anticipate the event 
when he or she formulated the estate plan?156 Following the consequential 
 
 
that to be done would indeed make unstable, if not utterly destroy, the rule itself.” In re Martin’s 
Estate, 190 N.W. 872, 874 (Neb. 1922). “One may not dispose of his property by mere intentions 
. . . .” In re McGraw’s Estate, 207 N.W. 10, 11 (Mich. 1926). In jurisdictions where extrinsic evidence 
is admissible, however, courts admit declarations into evidence. Fillers v. Cannon, No. 105, 1986 WL 
3889, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1986). Several opinions defend this rule of evidence by analogy 
to revocation by act, where parol evidence of intent is once again admissible. In re Estate of Mercure, 
216 N.W.2d 914, 918–19 (Mich. 1974); In re McGraw’s Estate, 207 N.W. at 13 (Sharp, J., dissenting). 
Here, the misidentification of the instant doctrine as a form of revocation, see supra text at note 110, 
causes confusion. Declarations pertaining to revocation by act are credible because the additional 
symbolic action required demonstrates intent to achieve legal consequences. See also supra note 130 
and accompanying text. No symbolic act accompanies an implied revocation; all we have is a naked 
declaration, making its intended significance and finality less clear. 
 153. Even regarding divorce, courts acknowledge that instances in which testators wish to 
maintain estate plans benefitting a former spouse “are not infrequent,” In re McGraw’s Estate, 207 
N.W. at 12 (Sharpe, J., dissenting), are “a real possibility,” Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 
1323 (8th Cir. 1991), are “not beyond the realm of comprehension,” Hinders v. Hinders, 828 So.2d 
1235, 1244–45 (Miss. 2002), and a conclusive presumption to the contrary “could lead, in some 
instances, to an incongruous result,” In re Estate of Forrest, 706 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999). For a sociological study of post-dissolution relationships, see ANNE-MARIE AMBERT, EX-
SPOUSES AND NEW SPOUSES: A STUDY OF RELATIONSHIPS 23–59 (1989). 
 154. In re Estate of Blanchard, 218 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Mich. 1974) (Kavanaugh, C.J., dissenting) 
(also emphasizing the need for certainty); In re Estate of Knospe, 626 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (Sur. Ct. 
1995); Mearns v. Scharbach, 5 P.3d 29, 34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 
255 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (deeming extrinsic evidence too equivocal). 
 155. Were extrinsic evidence admissible within the framework of a temporary presumption, that 
presumption could flip after its time expires, so that what was initially a rebuttable presumption of 
changed intent becomes a rebuttable presumption of unaltered intent. A presumption that flipped from 
rebuttable to conclusive (or vise versa) is also possible but would want structural consistency. 
 156. For an early example of a will executed in contemplation of imminent marriage, see Charlton 
v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298, 299 (Ohio 1875). For examples of wills executed prior to imminent 
divorces, see In re Buchman’s Estate, 281 P.2d 608, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (bequeathing part of the 
estate to spouse while divorce negotiations were in progress); In re Estate of Thompson, 475 N.E.2d 
1135, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (disinheriting spouse); Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 916 (bequeathing 
entire estate to soon-to-be former spouse); Cooke v. Cooke, 154 N.Y.S.2d 757, 761 (App. Div. 1956) 
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event, how did the testator treat the will? Was it discovered among the 
testator’s important papers, or among worthless papers?157 Specifically in 
the context of divorce, does the former spouse have custody over minor 
children of the testator?158 And also in that context, what was the de facto 
relationship of the testator and the former spouse following divorce? In a 
surprising number of published cases, the two have continued to live 
together as a couple.159 
4. The Code 
We turn finally to assay the Uniform Probate Code provisions on 
implied revocation. These cover the conventional trio of childbirth, 
marriage, and divorce as triggering events and operate (again according to 
tradition) irrespective of the length of time a testator leaves the will 
unchanged. In other respects, though, the Code features eye-catching, if 
not always clear-sighted, innovations. 
To their credit, the Commissioners have led the way in applying 
empirical evidence to implied revocation in one instance. The Code pares 
 
 
(bequeathing part of the estate to soon-to-be former spouse, and part to soon-to-be new spouse). In 
Mercure, the court deemed this evidence significant. Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 916. In Buchman and 
Cooke, implied revocation was not at issue. 
 157. This distinction, which courts sometimes consider to establish intent in connection with 
holographic wills and conditional wills, has not figured prominently in implied revocation cases, 
although it is noted occasionally. Luff, 359 F.2d at 239 (former spouse argued that testator “kept [will] 
in a bureau drawer in his apartment where it was found after his death, and that this indicated an 
intention not to revoke it.”); Hinders, 828 So.2d at 1243 (former spouse “emphasizes that [testator] . . . 
kept this will in his possession, readily at hand in his desk drawer.”); Rankin v. McDearmon, 270 
S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (predissolution will was “found among some old and 
worthless papers of the deceased”). 
 158. Several courts have suggested that in this event, an inference of intent to revoke a 
predissolution will may be unjustified. Whirlpool, 929 F.2d at 1323; In re McGraw’s Estate, 199 N.W. 
686, 688 (Mich. 1924), appeal from new trial 207 N.W. 10 (Mich. 1926); see also Cooke, 154 
N.Y.S.2d at 761 (where testator affirmatively bequeathed to spouse in contemplation of divorce, 
making their daughter contingent beneficiary if spouse predeceased testator). 
 159. Estate of Reeves v. Reeves, 284 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (Ct. App. 1991) (evidence inadmissible 
to override implied revocation); In re Estate of Pekol, 499 N.E.2d 88, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same); 
Rasco v. Estate of Rasco, 501 So.2d 421, 424 (Miss. 1987) (evidence admitted to override implied 
revocation); In re Estate of Perigen, 653 S.W.2d 717, 718–19 (Tenn. 1983) (same); In re Estate of 
Hoevet, 436 P.2d 540, 541 (Wyo. 1968) (same); see also Offerman v. Rosile, 77 P.3d 504, 506 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2003) (“Neither party remarried, and [they] apparently continued to have a close social 
relationship,” the admissibility of this evidence not at issue); Mercure, 216 N.W. at 916 (testator lived 
next door to, ate his meals with, and transferred his telephone service to the home of former spouse 
and her new husband, sufficing to override implied revocation); Romero v. Melendez, 498 P.2d 305, 
306 (N.M. 1972) (couple contemplated remarriage shortly after divorce, this evidence insufficient to 
overcome implied revocation); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Sladoje, 776 N.E.2d 1057, 1058 (Ohio 2002) 
(collateral suit involving estate of testator where divorce resulted in implied revocation even though 
couple continued to live together). 
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back the doctrine in connection with wills executed before childbirth in 
deference to studies showing that modern wills typically place the 
surviving spouse ahead of children in the scheme of inheritance.160 Other 
doctrinal novelties, however, want such a statistical foundation; the 
Commissioners have not shied away from translating into action their own 
suppositions about how the average testator responds to events. 
Consider the Code’s provision on wills executed before marriage. The 
Code impliedly revokes the premarital will to the extent necessary to 
furnish the new spouse an intestate share but excepts from revocation any 
bequests to children or their descendants under the premarital will.161 
Although the comment is silent, the Reporter elsewhere defends this 
refinement as directed to “late-in-life marriage in which [the testator’s] 
instincts would likely be to want to continue to provide for her children 
from her first marriage.”162 Apparently, the Reporter relied on his own 
judgment to establish those instincts—no citation to evidence follows the 
pronouncement.163 
One wonders whether the Reporter’s assessment would change were he 
to consider that this exception to the doctrine of implied revocation under 
the Code covers a broader assortment of cases than just late-in-life 
remarriage. The second marriage could come early in life, following rapid 
 
 
 160. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a)(2) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 135 (1998) (giving a 
share to new children only if the testator had children before the will was executed and made bequests 
to them, and then only a co-equal fraction of those bequests). The accompanying comment refers to 
pertinent empirical studies. Id. § 2-302 cmt. The original Uniform Probate Code operated differently. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 322 (1998) (pre-1990 Article 2). Statutes based on the 
revised Code are presently in effect in eleven jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6 reporter’s note 2 (1999). The Commissioners took a step 
backward in 2008, however, by removing posthumously born children from the purview of this section 
of the Code. See supra note 121. 
 161. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a). Hence, if a premarital will bequeaths the entire estate to 
children from a prior marriage, no implied revocation will occur at all, although the new spouse can 
still claim a minimum elective share (or share of the community estate). The original Uniform Probate 
Code did not include this qualification. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 317 (1998) 
(pre-1990 Article 2). Statutes based on the revised Code are presently in effect in twelve jurisdictions. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 9.5 reporter’s note 1.a. 
 162. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised 
Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 750 (1992); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP. § 9.5 cmt. g, illus. 4 (chaired by the same Reporter, and reproducing this reasoning); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 cmt. (ignoring the issue). The Reporter adds that the testator “without 
the advice of competent legal counsel . . . could hardly be expected to appreciate the need for a new 
will that would merely repeat the provisions in her old will for her children.” Waggoner, supra, at 750. 
Here, the Reporter acknowledges the risk of error that in truth is implicit in any time-independent 
doctrine of implied revocation, although the Code does not respond by abandoning those doctrines. On 
the contrary, the Code elsewhere expands them. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Waggoner, supra note 162, at 750. 
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divorce (a far more common phenomenon, statistically164) or the 
premature death of the first spouse. The child or children benefitting under 
the premarital will could still be minors, and the testator (with a new 
spouse in the household) might have custody over them. And the testator 
could have additional children with the new spouse.165 At any rate, some 
data on testamentary preferences following remarriage are extant. All 
studies have found a more prevalent intent to provide for the new spouse 
than the Reporter infers.166  
In this instance, the Commissioners’ intuitions led them to a more 
parsimonious application of the doctrine of implied revocation. In another 
instance, however, they have chosen to expand it. The Code’s provision 
revoking bequests under a will executed prior to a divorce covers not only 
bequests to the former spouse, but also bequests to any relative of the 
former spouse who is not independently related to the testator.167 The 
Commissioners justify this rule in the accompanying comment: 
Given that, during the divorce process or in the aftermath of the 
divorce, the former spouse’s relatives are likely to side with the 
 
 
 164. Approximately 43% of American marriages now end in divorce. The median duration of first 
marriages dissolved by divorce is currently 8 years, while the median time between a first divorce and 
remarriage, among those who remarry, is 3.6 years for women and 3 years for men; women’s average 
age at remarriage is 33. Larry Bumpass et al., Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 747, 750, 753 (1990); Lawrence Ganong et al., Divorce as Prelude to Stepfamily Living and the 
Consequences of Redivorce, in HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION 409, 410 
(Mark A. Fine & John H. Harvey eds., 2006); Robert Schoen & Robin M. Weinick, The Slowing 
Metabolism of Marriage: Figures from 1988 U.S. Marital Status Life Tables, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 737, 
742 (1993). One study remarks that “[w]e tend to think of marital disruption as an event well into the 
life cycle. However, more than half of recent marital disruptions occurred before age 30, about a third 
before age 25.” Bumpass et al., supra, at 749. Apparently, the Commissioners shared this 
misconception. That is the risk of relying on intuition instead of evidence. See also Arthur J. Norton, 
The Influence of Divorce on Traditional Life-Cycle Measures, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 63, 65–68 
(1980) (noting a dramatic drop in average age at divorce in the United States over the 20th century). 
 165. This too is nowadays common. Howard Wineberg, Childbearing After Remarriage, 52 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 31, 31, 37 (1990). In this scenario, under the Code, if the premarital will 
bequeathed the entire estate to children from the prior marriage, the doctrine of implied revocation 
would protect only children conceived with the new spouse, not the new spouse himself or herself. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301(a), 2-302(a)(2). 
 166. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 91–95 (Ohio data); Fellows et al., Empirical Study, supra 
note 116, at 727–29, 732 (Illinois data); Fellows et al., Public Attitudes, supra note 116, at 364–68 
(data from five states). For anecdotal illustrations, see Gray v. Gray, 947 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Ala. 
2006); In re Estate of Perigen, 653 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tenn. 1983). These data should be known to the 
Commissioners, since they cite two of the studies elsewhere in the Code. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-
102 cmt., 2-302 cmt. 
 167. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1). The original Uniform Probate Code confined the 
doctrine of implied revocation to the former spouse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 376 
(1998) (pre-1990 Article 2). Statutes based on the revised Code are presently in effect in some ten 
jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 4.1 statutory note 2.a. See also infra note 173. 
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former spouse, breaking down or weakening any former ties that 
may previously have developed between the [testator] and the 
former spouse’s relatives, seldom would the [testator] have favored 
[their inheritance].168 
Accepting the Commissioners’ reasoning for the sake of argument, we 
may observe that the rule they crafted in response fails to operate 
reciprocally. Whereas bequests from a testator to a former spouse’s 
relatives are revoked by implication upon divorce, bequests from those 
relatives to their former son- or daughter-in-law (for example) remain 
effective under the Code.169 Yet, if they “side[d]”170 with their 
consanguine in the divorce, they should be equally intent on disinheriting 
their former affine. This doctrinal asymmetry represents a logical flaw in 
the Code. 
As for the reasoning itself, it appears in the comment as an ipse dixit, 
unsupported by a single scholarly reference. Instead, the Reporter 
elsewhere defends the rule with a hypothetical: 
Ben and Elaine had a happy . . . marriage. [Ben’s] will . . . 
designated Elaine as the primary beneficiary at Ben’s death. Ben, an 
only child whose parents had died, attempted to foster good 
relations with Elaine’s parents by naming them as the alternative 
beneficiaries. . . . Eventually Ben and Elaine[] . . . divorce[d]. 
Shortly after the divorce, Elaine married Carl. And shortly 
[there]after . . . Ben died. . . . If Elaine does not benefit under Ben’s 
[predissolution will], who does? Conventional statutes resolve that 
question by invoking the fiction that Elaine predeceased Ben. In 
consequence, Ben’s property would apparently pass to Elaine’s 
parents as alternative beneficiaries. Because such an outcome 
appears inconsistent with Ben’s likely intent, the 1990 UPC also 
revokes any disposition to the former spouse’s relatives.171 
Of course, one can always construct a scenario for which a rule yields 
an appropriate outcome. That is the forensic equivalent of drawing a 
bull’s-eye after one fires the rifle shot.172 The real question is one of 
statistical probability within the ambit of possible scenarios. The bequest 
 
 
 168. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt. 
 169. See id. § 2-804(b). 
 170. Id. § 2-804 cmt. 
 171. Waggoner, supra note 162, at 689–90, 694–95 (footnote omitted). 
 172. See the delightful Russian folk tale recounted in J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The 
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1461 (1987) (book review). 
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at issue may designate an alternative beneficiary to the former spouse. 
Contrarily, the bequest may be in addition to the one for the former 
spouse.173 The beneficiary named may be an ascendant or collateral affine. 
Or—probably in a large majority of instances where this rule comes into 
play—the beneficiary may be a stepchild of the testator.174 
On the specific matter of inheritance patterns following divorce, we 
lack hard data. Nonetheless, the sociological literature offers an abundance 
of material on divorce, stepfamilies, and (less so) redivorce that is 
germane to the issue at hand, including hundreds of published empirical 
studies.175 The Commissioners failed to mine this body of research—they 
did not do the leg work. Had they delved into the literature, it might have 
given them pause. 
The question is whether a spouse’s relationship with stepchildren and 
other quasi-kin (in the sociologists’ jargon) depends on the continuity of 
the marriage or instead can “take on a life of its own.”176 Empirical 
research on supportive relationships between a child-in-law and parent-in-
law finds that these can go on after divorce, although they do so relatively 
infrequently.177 The two empirical studies of testation by former in-laws 
published to date explore attitudes rather than actual behavior and focus on 
bequests to members of a divorcing couple. The studies found only a 
minority of subjects to consider bequests to a former son- or daughter-in-
 
 
 173. In New Hampshire, the statute distinguishes these two cases: Only alternative bequests to 
stepchildren (or their descendants) are revoked by implication, along with primary bequests to former 
spouses, under predissolution wills. Otherwise, bequests to stepchildren or in-laws are unaffected by 
divorce. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13 (Supp. 2002); see In re Estate of Sharek, 930 A.2d 388, 390 
(N.H. 2007) (applying statute to validate alternative bequest to former brother-in-law). 
 174. See Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75, 77 (Pa. 1989) (“Many would view this [bequest to a step-
uncle] as an unusual testamentary scheme . . . .”). Since the divorce rate for remarriages is even higher 
than for first marriages, Teresa Castro et al., Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 
37, 39, 44–48 (1989), the problem of bequests to former stepchildren is bound to arise with some 
frequency. 
 175. For review essays remarking the burgeoning literature, see Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. 
Ganong, Remarriage and Stepfamily Research in the 1980s: Increased Interest in an Old Family 
Form, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 925, 925 (1990); Marilyn Coleman et al., Reinvestigating Remarriage: 
Another Decade of Progress, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1288, 1288 (2000). 
 176. Maria Schmeeckle et al., What Makes Someone Family? Adult Children’s Perceptions of 
Current and Former Stepparents, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 606 (2006). 
 177. Constance R. Ahrons & Madonna E. Bowman, Changes in Family Relationships Following 
Divorce of Adult Child: Grandmother’s Perceptions, 5 J. DIVORCE 49, 53 (1981); Anne-Marie Ambert, 
Relationships with Former In-laws after Divorce: A Research Note, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 679, 
682–85 (1988); Donald Anspach, Kinship and Divorce, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 323, 325–27 (1976); 
Jerry W. Spicer & Gary D. Hampe, Kinship Interaction After Divorce, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 113, 
116–18 (1975) (finding parents-in-law interact more with former daughters- than sons-in-law); cf. 
Janet Finch & Jennifer Mason, Divorce, Remarriage and Family Obligations, 38 SOC. REV. 219, 225–
28 (1990) (finding normative approval of mutually supportive relationships with former in-laws). 
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law appropriate.178 Still, we should interpret these data cautiously since the 
studies found greater approval of bequests to former children-in-laws if 
the testator’s social relationship with them survives a divorce,179 and the 
likelihood of that occurring is tied to their closeness during the 
marriage.180 When wills include bequests to in-laws, that fact in itself 
could signify that the parties were close to begin with, although we have 
no assurance of such a correlation. 
Turning to stepchildren, we again face a shortage of hard data but a 
surfeit of related data. Hardly any empirical studies of bequest patterns to 
stepchildren (let alone former stepchildren) appear in the literature.181 
Sociologists have, however, examined the conditions under which 
emotional bonds between a stepparent and stepchild form.182 These are 
most likely to arise if the child joined the stepfamily as an infant or toddler 
and resided within the stepparent’s household.183 Under those conditions, 
the resulting ties can simulate those binding parent and child.184 
 
 
 178. Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Attitudes Toward Inheritance Following Divorce 
and Remarriage, 19 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 289, 301 (1998); Annelle Z. Weymuth, Attitudes About 
Intergenerational Family Obligations Related to Providing Inheritance 15 (May 1997) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia) (on file with author). 
 179. Coleman & Ganong, supra note 178, at 303–04; Weymuth, supra note 178, at 15–17. 
 180. Candan Duran-Aydintug, Relationships with Former In-Laws: Normative Guidelines and 
Actual Behavior, 19 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 71, 73, 78–80 (1993); see also ROBERT S. WEISS, 
MARITAL SEPARATION 144–47 (1975) (reporting anecdotal evidence); Finch & Mason, supra note 177, 
at 228–44 (also identifying the amicability of the divorce process as a relevant factor). 
 181. The one published discussion reports the results of a survey limited to affluent testators. It 
found that 40–41% of respondents believe natural children and stepchildren should be treated equally 
in the estate plan. Whether responses were limited to subjects who actually had stepchildren is unclear. 
Kim Porter, The Will of the Wealthy, TR. & EST., Aug. 1999, at 56, 56. See also FINCH ET AL., supra 
note 77, at 101–03 (British data, finding variability in the treatment of stepchildren).  
 182. Experts aside, lay persons appreciate the potential for such bonding sufficiently for it to be 
depicted on occasion in popular culture (Cinderella notwithstanding). In the delightful feature film 
THE RELUCTANT DEBUTANTE (MGM 1958), an upper-class British stepmother (played by the late Kay 
Kendall) is portrayed as intensely ambitious for her half-American stepdaughter and reacts with 
raptures of joy when her fiancé, at first mistaken for a bounder, is revealed as heir to an Italian duke. 
 183. For recent empirical studies, see Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads 
Equal? Biology Versus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213 
passim (2003) (also finding that stepparents’ bonds with stepchildren intensify over time); Maria 
Schmeeckle, Gender Dynamics in Stepfamilies: Adult Stepchildren’s Views, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
174 passim (2007); Maria Schmeeckle, Rethinking the Ties that Bind: Adult Children’s Perception of 
Step, Ex-Step, and Biological Parents 88–99 (Dec. 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Southern California) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schmeeckle, Rethinking]; Susan D. Stewart, 
How the Birth of a Child Affects Involvement with Stepchildren, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 461 passim 
(2005) (finding that birth of a child affects stepfamilies and intact families similarly). For reviews of 
the growing literature, see LAWRENCE H. GANONG & MARILYN COLEMAN, STEPFAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS 109–44 (2004); Ganong et al., supra note 164, at 417–21. 
 184. For a recent study, see William Marsiglio, When Stepfathers Claim Stepchildren: A 
Conceptual Analysis, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 22 passim (2004). See also, e.g., LUCILE DUBERMAN, 
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Again, whether bequests to stepchildren generally reflect the quality of 
their relationship with the stepparent remains unknown. Sociological 
studies demonstrate both the possibility and plausibility of emotional 
attachments after divorce, but the factors that might cause those 
attachments to endure—or to unravel—remain unexplored.185 Within the 
area of family law, many states now recognize these relationships by 
granting former stepparents the right to petition for visitation rights, and 
cases litigating those rights are numerous; in a few instances, stepparents 
have even petitioned for, and been awarded, custody of stepchildren upon 
divorce.186 
To be sure, these cases tell us nothing about the relative frequency with 
which stepparents maintain ties with former stepchildren. What the cases 
do reveal is that some number of stepparents are indefatigable, sticking 
with their stepchildren through thick and thin. Without exception, courts 
have refused to extend implied revocation to stepchildren or other in-laws 
without statutory warrant,187 and most have declined to take judicial notice 
 
 
THE RECONSTRUCTED FAMILY 52–53, 63 (1975) (anecdotal evidence); ELIZABETH EINSTEIN, THE 
STEPFAMILY 51, 189–90 (1982) (same); for additional sources, see supra note 183. 
 185. One empirical study finds that fewer former than current adult stepchildren view the former 
or current stepparent as a “parent,” but without breaking down the data vis-à-vis the attributes of the 
former relationship. Schmeeckle et al., supra note 176, at 603–08. Another empirical study finds an 
“almost unanimous” preference among stepparents for continued contact with stepchildren in the event 
of divorce. Mary A. Mason et al., Stepparents: De Facto Parents or Legal Strangers?, 23 J. FAM. 
ISSUES 507, 517 (2002); see also Rosalind Edwards et al., Biological Parents and Social Families: 
Legal Discourses and Everyday Understandings of the Position of Step-Parents, 13 INT’L J.L. POL’Y 
& FAM. 78, 97 (1999) (British study finding the same preference). But see Ganong et al., supra note 
164, at 428 (“We know of no research on the outcomes of redivorce. . . . Anecdotally, we know that 
former stepparents and stepchildren tend to sever relationships with each other after divorce.”); cf. 
Schmeeckle, Rethinking, supra note 183, at 149–54 (presenting anecdotal evidence based on 
hypothetical questions put to current stepchildren, which elicited varied responses). 
 186. MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 129–47 (1994); Jason D. Hans, 
Stepparenting After Divorce: Stepparents’ Legal Position Regarding Custody, Access, and Support, 51 
FAM. REL. 301, 302–03, 307 (2002); Marie W. Kargman, Stepchild Support Obligations of 
Stepparents, 32 FAM. REL. 231, 236–37 (1983); Laura W. Morgan, The Rights, Duties, and 
Responsibilities of Stepparents to Their Stepchildren: Custody and Visitation, 8 DIVORCE LITIG. 185, 
186–88, 191–93 (1996); Susan M. Silverman, Note, Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best 
Interests of the Child, 30 J. FAM. L. 943 passim (1991–92). 
 187. Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084, 1095 (Mass. 1985); Bowling v. Deaton, 507 N.E.2d 
1152, 1154 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); In re Estate of Kerr, 520 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); 
In re Estate of Coffed, 399 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (App. Div. 1977), aff’d 387 N.E.2d 1209 (N.Y. 1979); 
Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75, 77 (Pa. 1989); In re Estate of Graef, 368 N.W.2d 633, 635–36 (Wis. 
1985); see also In re Walker, 849 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tenn. 1993) (dictum). The Third Restatement 
nonetheless asserts that courts construing an existing implied revocation statute limited to the former 
spouse “should effectuate the purpose of the statute by extending its terms to revoke the devise to [a 
testator’s former stepchildren].” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 4.1 illus. 12 & reporter’s note 10 (1999) (chaired by the Reporter of the Uniform Probate 
Code). However we assess the Code’s expansive approach as a matter of policy, we may harbor 
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that divorce severs ties with anyone except a spouse.188 The 
Commissioners’ boldness is conspicuous by comparison. 
Having begun with an unproven hypothesis, the Commissioners 
proceed to exclude extrinsic evidence that might serve to disprove it.189 
Except in limited circumstances, all of the presumptions of implied 
revocation created under the Code comprise conclusive presumptions. 
Thus, not only subjective evidence concerning the quality of the testator’s 
relationship with a former stepchild, but also objective evidence (for 
example) that a testator sought visitation rights or custody of a former 
stepchild is inadmissible to rebut the presumption of implied revocation 
upon divorce.190 The same exclusion applies to evidence concerning the 
quality of a testator’s relationship with the former spouse, although here 
again intent to bequeath vel non might be clarified without undue cost.191 
On top of this, the Code’s treatment of implied revocation bristles with 
inconsistencies. On the one hand, the Commissioners wisely apply their 
rule of implied revocation for predissolution wills to will substitutes as 
well.192 On the other hand, for no apparent reason, the parallel provisions 
of the Code covering premarital and prenatal estate plans apply 
exclusively to wills.193 Another slip involves the treatment of a beneficiary 
 
 
misgivings when a Restatement, as a matter of jurisprudence, gives its imprimatur to acts of judicial 
legislation. 
 188. “There is no reason to assume that in all or even most cases a testator estranged from his 
spouse will also be estranged from . . . relatives of that spouse.” Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655 
(Iowa 1979). “This is a highly individualized matter, . . . and it cannot be said that the likelihood of 
estranged feelings is sufficiently high as to warrant nullification. . . . Such a [bequest] may evidence an 
unusually close bond [to the in-law].” Bloom, 555 A.2d at 77. See also Clymer, 473 N.E.2d at 1095; 
Kerr, 520 N.E.2d at 514 (similar statements). But see Hermon v. Urteago, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 581 
(Ct. App. 1995) (endorsing the Code and its rationale in a will construction case). Cf. In re Estate of 
Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 916–18 (Tex. 2007) (possibly reflecting judicial bias against a stepchild). 
 189. Cf. Estate of Jones, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637, 638, 643–45 (Ct. App. 2004) (resolving whether a 
will’s description of beneficiaries as “my stepdaughters” imposed a condition that they maintain that 
status by admitting extrinsic evidence to show whether “the testator had a relationship with a child of a 
divorced spouse that continued following the divorce,” and also deeming relevant the fact that the 
appellant stepdaughter “was already an adult when her mother married [the testator], and so there is no 
issue of the bond associated with raising a child.”). 
 190. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 2008). Court 
orders can override a presumption of revocation, but only by their “express terms.” Id. If the testator 
adopts a stepchild, a bequest to him or her is not impliedly revoked by divorce, id. § 2-804(a)(5), but 
this option may not exist if the nonresidential parent remains alive. MAHONEY, supra note 186, at 161–
77. For an empirical study, see Kathleen A. Lamb, “I Want to Be Just Like Their Real Dad”: Factors 
Associated with Stepfather Adoption, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 1162 passim (2007). See also infra note 195 
and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
 192. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b). See generally Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-
Divorce Statutes To Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83 (2004). 
 193. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301(a), 2-302(a). Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 5000, 5600, 6122, 
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named in an initial will whose status is upgraded over time. If a will 
includes a bequest for a person who subsequently weds the testator, the 
Code nevertheless grants the beneficiary an intestate share, unless the will 
was executed in contemplation of marriage, on the theory that the testator 
would probably intend to increase the bequest to reflect their changed 
relationship.194 The Commissioners fail to duplicate this rule by analogy. 
If a will already provides for a stepchild or foster child whom the testator 
subsequently adopts, the child cannot claim a larger share under the Code; 
the Code only increases the share of a child “omitted” from a prenatal or 
pre-adoption will.195 
The Code’s rules of evidence exhibit similar inconsistencies. The Code 
allows parties to overcome the inference of intent to update a premarital 
will by introducing extrinsic evidence to show “that the will was made in 
contemplation of the testator’s marriage.”196 Yet, for no apparent reason, 
evidence of premeditation is inadmissible with regard to either 
predissolution or prenatal wills: wills made in contemplation of divorce or 
childbirth are nevertheless subject to rules of implied revocation unless the 
will expressly provides otherwise.197 The Commissioners offer no 
explanation for this asymmetry. 
The Code also admits extrinsic evidence in the form of “the testator’s 
statements or . . . the amount of the transfer or other evidence” to show 
that a testator who made an inter vivos gift to a child born, or spouse wed, 
after the execution of a will “inten[ded] that the transfer be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision.”198 In other words, the Code adds a rule akin to 
ademption by satisfaction for bequests created by implication. Yet the 
 
 
21601, 21610, 21620 (Deering 2004) (applying all the rules of implied revocation to both wills and 
will substitutes, although not with perfect consistency). See also In re Estate of Jackson, 194 P.3d 
1269, 1273–75 (Okla. 2008) (construing non-Uniform implied revocation statute to apply only to 
wills). 
 194. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a) & cmt. 
 195. Id. § 2-302(a). This scenario has produced a steady stream of litigation. For cases analogizing 
the problem of premarital bequests for then-friends with pre-adoption bequests for after-adopted 
children, see Estate of Turkington, 195 Cal. Rptr. 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Guilmartin’s Estate, 
282 N.Y.S. 525, 526–30 (Sur. Ct. 1935), aff’d 293 N.Y.S. 665 (App. Div. 1937), aff’d 14 N.E.2d 627 
(N.Y. 1938). For additional cases on point, see Davis v. Davis, 365 A.2d 1004 (Md. 1976); Bowdlear 
v. Bowdlear, 112 Mass. 184 (1873); In re McPeak Estate, 534 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); In 
re Stier’s Will, 345 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sur. Ct. 1973); Brown v. Crawford, 699 P.2d 162 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1985); DeSolms Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 322 (Orphans’ Ct. 1956); In re Estate of Hamilton, 441 P.2d 
768, 770 (Wash. 1968). 
 196. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a)(1). 
 197. Id. §§ 2-302(b)(1), 2-804(b) (also providing that a contract made within the context of a 
divorce settlement supersedes an implied revocation). 
 198. Id. §§ 2-301(a)(3), 2-302(b)(2). 
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Code already contains a rule of ademption by satisfaction that is readily 
generalizable.199 The Commissioners have no need to reinvent this rule. 
The Code fails to treat the satisfaction of express and implied bequests 
symmetrically. The usual doctrine of ademption by satisfaction, covering 
an express bequest, operates incrementally: a gift in partial satisfaction of 
a bequest is adeemed pro tanto.200 Not so the parallel doctrine for 
satisfaction of a bequest implied by changed circumstances, which is an 
all-or-nothing rule.201 In addition, the rules of evidence applicable to 
satisfaction of express and implied bequests differ. The only extrinsic 
evidence admissible to show intent to satisfy an express bequest is a 
“contemporaneous writing” by the testator, or an acknowledgment in 
writing by the beneficiary.202 On the other hand, as just noted, intent to 
satisfy an implied bequest can be shown by oral declaration at any time, or 
simply by the scale of the inter vivos transfer.203 
Why the asymmetry? The accompanying comments are devoid of 
comparative analysis. A former comment, however, called attention to the 
evidentiary aspect of the asymmetry (while ignoring the quantal aspect) 
and justified it on the ground that in connection with an implied bequest 
“there is no real contradiction of testamentary intent, since there is no 
provision in the will itself for the omitted child.”204 This argument is 
unpersuasive. In essence, the issue concerns the credibility vel non of 
extrinsic evidence, coupled with a formalized act (namely, delivery of a 
gift). That credibility does not hinge on whether an amendment of express 
language in a will or an implied bequest stands at issue. What is more, the 
argument proves too much: on this logic, the Code should distinguish the 
treatment of extrinsic evidence in connection with satisfaction of bequests 
and advancements of an intestate share, where again no provision in a will 
is implicated. Yet, the Code applies the same, stricter requirement of 
documentary evidence to both situations.205 
In fact, each of the Code’s alternative rules of evidence—lying on 
opposite sides of the common law rule—is vulnerable to criticism. As 
earlier observed, the common law of ademption by satisfaction admits into 
evidence contemporaneous declarations of intent, following the usual 
assumption that declarations coupled with a formalistic act are credibly 
 
 
 199. Id. § 2-609. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 200. Id. § 2-609(a) (a gift may satisfy a bequest “in whole or in part”). 
 201. Id. §§ 2-301(a), 2-302(b). 
 202. Id. § 2-609(a). 
 203. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 204. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 322 (1998) (pre-1990 Article 2).  
 205. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-109(a), 2-609(a).  
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performative.206 In this light, the Code’s requirement of documentary 
evidence to override the presumption against ademption by satisfaction 
appears unduly strict. But also in this light, the Code’s allowance of non-
contemporaneous declarations to show intent to satisfy an implied bequest 
appears unduly lax.207 Once a declaration is decoupled from any 
formalistic act, the testator’s intent that it be legally effective grows 
uncertain and for that reason is generally inadmissible in other contexts.208 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that inheritance law should pursue an approach 
to testamentary obsolescence premised on the practical latitude testators 
have to update their own estate plans. Given the many and varied settings 
in which these texts come into effect, the theory developed here suggests a 
more complex solution to the problem of obsolescence than is ordinarily 
posited for its counterparts in the constitutional or legislative arenas.209 
Current law conforms to the theory in some respects, but not others. The 
theory, for example, supports dynamic interpretation of the wills of 
testators slain by beneficiaries in more situations than inheritance law 
presently recognizes. By contrast, the theory suggests scaling back the 
doctrine of implied revocation into a temporary presumption, making only 
provisional allowances for consequential events. Still, data are required to 
confirm these hypotheses.  
Indeed, in every situation where theory warrants intervention to 
effectuate probable intent, we need data to guide our course. Some data are 
available today, but we must have more. Without data to inform our law, 
we are flying blind and cannot tell how far off target our hunches and 
conjectures are carrying us. 
This refrain has sounded before. More than sixty years ago, a leading 
inheritance scholar of his era, Professor William Page, issued a like 
complaint:  
 
 
 206. See supra notes 126, 130 and accompanying text. 
 207. In its attention to the size of the gift, however, the Code’s approach to satisfaction of implied 
bequests bears a closer resemblance to the common law. See supra note 127.  
 208. The general exclusion of extrinsic evidence in connection with implied revocation also 
contrasts with the Code’s wide admissibility of extrinsic evidence in connection with ademption by 
extinction. See supra note 98. The Code’s treatment of stepchildren under its rules of implied 
revocation likewise clashes with their treatment under the Code’s antilapse rule. See supra note 90. 
 209. But cf. Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165 
passim (2008) (arguing against a monolithic approach to constitutional interpretation). 
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Even when at their very best, neither courts nor legislatures have 
made any . . . systematic attempt to follow up these rules and 
principles and to see how they work in real life. . . . [W]hether they 
achieve the desired result in the majority of cases or whether they 
defeat it, is rarely learned by courts or legislatures, and then only by 
chance. No branch of government is charged with this duty. No 
appropriations are made to secure this result. On a priori theories 
our law is largely built up; and a priori our theories often remain 
from start to finish.210  
If lawmaking bodies will not fill this void, who can? Is this not ideal 
work for law modelers—that is, the law reform organizations 
promulgating exemplary statutes and rules for adoption by the states? By 
proceeding on the basis of hard data, the Uniform Law Commission and 
the American Law Institute could distinguish their handiwork from that of 
legislative drafting committees and courts. But in fact neither organization 
funds empirical research for its projects.211 Only the occasional, random 
academic study illuminates patches of the field. 
However unfortunate this state of affairs, lawmakers (and law 
modelers) must soldier on regardless, catching as catch can the evidence 
available. As the Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code observes, 
“requiring a systematic empirical study before any reform can be put into 
place would paralyze the law-reform process.”212 The point is well taken, 
yet the Commissioners—perhaps seeking to put the best face on a bad 
situation—have staked out a position on the subject of empirical evidence 
that is too complaisant. The Reporter continues: 
[The concern] that there is no systematic empirical study supporting 
section[s of the Code] . . . might be justified if the law-reform 
process were in the hands of amateurs who know little about the 
field or the practice. . . . [T]he Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform 
Probate Code . . . is an organization that counts among its members 
not only leading scholars in the field but also nationally known 
estate planners of considerable insight and experience. . . . Their 
cumulative experience suggests that they have a pretty good idea of 
what most clients want.213 
 
 
 210. William H. Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 WIS. L. REV. 11, 38. 
 211. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to 
Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309, 2337 (1996). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 2337–38. 
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Truth be known, this sort of armchair empiricism holds little epistemic 
value.214 Yet, by relying on their own experience where necessary as a pis 
aller, the Commissioners may have gotten into the habit of trusting it 
generally. They have followed their instincts in the face of hard data in 
some instances215 and have failed to marshal related data in others.216 This 
modus operandi will not recommend their products to legislative drafting 
committees, which can also call upon experience to gauge probable intent. 
One educated guess is as good as another.  
At the end of the day, crafting superior rules of inheritance law will 
require the services not of the meta-theoretical scholar, nor of the seasoned 
estate planner, but of the humble pollster and statistician. Blessed are the 
meek, for they shall inherit the earth. 
 
 
 214. For fuller discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 37, at 1070–72; William Meadow & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 passim (2001). A disaffected Commissioner 
likewise warns that the drafters of the UCC, who “must be satisfied by ‘second best’ data such as . . . 
the experience of the Reporters, [and] members of the Drafting Committee, . . . will frequently be 
‘shooting in the dark’.” Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 607, 608–09 (2001).  
 215. See supra notes 90, 164–66 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 132, 175–86 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX 
We here model the concept of an error-minimizing default rule. We 
begin by analyzing the problem in the context of implied revocation of 
wills and then turn briefly to broader applications. 
Stipulate that lawmakers face a binary choice between implementing 
default rule x or y. Default rule x effects the result most parties prefer (the 
majoritarian default). In connection with consequential events that tend to 
change intent, default rule x would create a doctrine of implied revocation. 
Assume that the alternative, default rule y, comprises the rule that most 
persons who are ignorant of what rule applies believe is in effect. In 
connection with consequential events that do not cause impossibility, we 
assume default rule y would maintain the original estate plan. 
Let T be the total number of persons in the population (or sample) who 
are subject to a default rule, and let Nx be the number of persons who 
prefer outcome x; Ny prefer outcome y. Stipulate that Nx > Ny. 
Assume that a randomly distributed fraction of T, which we designate 
as (i), is ignorant of the default rule, while the remaining fraction (1-i) 
know or learn of the rule. Among ignorant parties, we simplify by 
assuming that all share the expectation that the rule is y. This 
simplification follows from the surmise—unproven, and requiring 
empirical proof, but seemingly plausible—that doctrines of implied 
revocation are counter-intuitive; ignorant testators assume their wills 
remain in effect until they amend them.217 As concerns other inheritance 
defaults, such as lapse and ademption by extinction, testators may harbor a 
wider range of assumptions, reducing the potential efficiency of 
expectation-based inheritance defaults by diluting or scattering error costs.  
Assume further that a randomly distributed fraction of T, which we 
designate as (p), procrastinate, failing to amend their wills in response to 
changed circumstances, while the remaining fraction (1-p) are vigilant 
estate planners. Notice that (p) in turn is a function of time: as more time 
elapses following a consequential event, (p) should become smaller. 
 
 
 217. See supra notes 117, 162. 
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If x is the rule:                                    If y is the rule:  
(1-i)(1-p)Nx bear no cost                   (1-i)(1-p)Nx bear a transaction cost  
(1-i)(1-p)Ny bear a transaction cost   (1-i)(1-p)Ny bear no cost 
(i)(1-p)Nx bear a transaction cost      (i)(1-p)Nx bear a transaction cost 
(i)(1-p)Ny bear an error cost             (i)(1-p)Ny bear no cost 
(p)Nx bear no cost                         (p)Nx bear an error cost 
(p)Ny bear an error cost                (p)Ny bear no cost 
We relate transaction costs and error costs with a coefficient (e), 
determined normatively, such that error costs = (e)transaction costs. 
Under what conditions is default rule y (the error-minimizing default) 
more efficient than default rule x (the majoritarian default)? Where: 
(1-i)(1-p)Nx + (i)(1-p)Nx + (e)(p)Nx < (1-i)(1-p)Ny + (i)(1-p)Nx + 
(e)(i)(1-p)Ny + (e)(p)Ny 
which reduces to:  
(1-i)(1-p)Nx + (e)(p)Nx < (1-i)(1-p)Ny + (e)(i)(1-p)Ny + (e)(p)Ny 
Notice that as the coefficient (e) increases—that is, as we accord 
greater weight to error costs—the equation approaches: 
(e)(p)Nx < (e)(i)(1-p)Ny + (e)(p)Ny 
which we can express as: 
Ny
Nx
<
p
i
+ (1-i) 
Hence, as the ratio of Nx to Ny grows larger, the condition becomes 
increasingly difficult to meet. Meanwhile, as the fraction (p) grows 
smaller (which it should over time) the condition becomes increasingly 
easy to meet. If the fraction (p) is 1—that is, if all persons procrastinate, 
which they do (no matter how vigilant they are) if death follows on the 
heels of a consequential event—then the right side of the equation 
becomes 1. Because Nx > Ny, the condition is not satisfied. Therefore, 
assuming (e) is large, an error-minimizing default is inefficient in the short 
term following a consequential event. 
The normative justification for making the coefficient (e) large is that 
error costs are negatively correlated with wealth: The poorer the testator, 
the more likely he or she is to bear error costs, especially because of 
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ignorance, since information is costly—hence, the often articulated policy 
against making the law of wills “a mere trap and pitfall.”218 At the same 
time, we likely have a second, purely economic reason to discount 
transaction costs. Empirical evidence may well show that few testators 
whose intent changes following a consequential event rely on a doctrine of 
implied revocation to save the expense of executing a new will. Even if the 
doctrine would operate to carry out their intent, vigilant testators may 
prefer to keep on the safe side and set out their revised estate plan 
explicitly.219 If all (or virtually all) vigilant testators will bear a transaction 
cost in any event, then only error costs are of consequence.  
Assuming, nevertheless, we let (e) be a smaller number, so that 
transaction costs remain significant in relation to error costs, then the 
primary equation reduces to: 
Ny
Nx
 < 
epipip
epeipeiipip
++−−
+−++−−
1
1
 
We can readily determine that the condition may or may not be 
satisfied. Hold (i) constant, and let (p) vary from 0 to 1. At p = 1 (all 
persons procrastinate, the case where death follows hard on a 
consequential event), the equation becomes: 
Ny
Nx
 < 1 
Again, because we have stipulated that Nx > Ny, the condition is not 
satisfied. Thus, irrespective of whether transaction costs are significant in 
relation to error costs, an error-minimizing default is never efficient in the 
short term following a consequential event. On the other hand, at p = 0 (no 
one procrastinates, a state we may approach over time, although we may 
also approach a limit above 0), the equation becomes: 
 
 
 218. E.g., Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (Va. 1990) (quoting Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 
55, 59 (Va. 1950)). But compare the Commissioners, who premise at least one default rule on legal 
assumptions that a testator “knows (or should know).” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-509 cmt. (amended 
2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 154 (1998). Does the obligation upon legal actors to know the law mean (as the 
Commissioners’ statement implies) that lawmakers can discount the importance of error costs when 
formulating rules initially? 
 219. As an early English critic of implied revocation observed, “It may safely be asserted, that the 
present law is not relied upon in practice; for no one neglects to cancel or alter his will, because he 
knows that his marriage and the birth of a child will have the effect of revoking it.” SUGDEN, supra 
note 71, at 204 app.  
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Ny
Nx
 < 
i
eii
−
+−
1
1
 
The condition may or may not be satisfied. As (i) approaches 0 (no 
ignorance either), the right side of the equation approaches 1 and, again, 
the condition is not satisfied. But as (i) approaches 1 (universal ignorance), 
the right side of the equation approaches ∞, and the condition is satisfied. 
Now hold (p) constant, and let (i) vary from 0 to 1. At i = 0 (no parties 
are ignorant), the equation becomes: 
Ny
Nx
 < 1 
Again, the condition is not satisfied. At i = 1 (all parties are ignorant), 
the equation becomes: 
Ny
Nx
 < 
p
1
 which we can alternatively express as: 
Nx
Ny
 > p  
The condition may or may not be satisfied. As p approaches 1, the 
condition is not satisfied, but as p approaches 0 the condition is satisfied. 
*               *               * 
In connection with contracts, the problem differs somewhat. Whereas 
wills are ambulatory, contracts are not. Therefore, procrastination is not a 
factor. But if either or both contracting parties are (1) ignorant of a default 
rule, and (2) fall into the subset of parties who prefer a rule that they 
mistakenly believe applies, they may lack motivation to include in the 
contract an express term overriding that default rule. Furthermore, they 
will be prone to agree on a contract price reflecting their false assumption 
about the applicable rule. By setting a default rule to conform to 
expectations, lawmakers ensure that the price fixed under the contract is 
economically appropriate, given the background rules that flesh out the 
terms of the contract. Whether error costs outweigh transaction costs in 
this context, causing an error-minimizing default to be more efficient than 
a majoritarian default, will depend on how widespread ignorance is among 
contracting parties, as well as the relative weight we assign (once again) to 
avoiding error costs, as compared to transaction costs, in the setting of 
contractual exchange. Under conditions of asymmetric information, where 
one party is sophisticated and the other not, error-minimizing defaults also 
serve to prevent rent-seeking by sophisticated parties, who might prefer 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss3/2
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strategically to leave contracts incomplete in order to exploit the legal 
ignorance of the other party.220 
 
 
 220. In this respect, an error-minimizing default can play a role similar to that of a penalty (or 
information-forcing) default. For a discussion of the latter, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 passim (1989). 
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